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Suppose you want to compare music downloading software and 
online music stores that allow you to download music without violating 
copyright law.  You don’t know a good search term for such a thing, but 
you do know the name iTunes and that iTunes is an example of one 
such service.  You don’t necessarily want Apple’s trademarked product, 
iTunes—in fact, you’ve heard that the software has some bugs and takes 
over your entire music library.  But for lack of a better term, you put 
“itunes” in as your search term on Google, an online search engine, 
hoping to get some choices.  You want to find something like iTunes, 
but not iTunes.  Under the logic of a number of recent federal appellate 
court decisions, however, the only result you should see is Apple’s 
iTunes because only Apple is the trademark holder of the term iTunes.1  
 
 1 This hypothetical is based in part on the following cases: Playboy Enters. v. Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing search engine to be held liable for 
third-party advertising displayed in response to trademarked search terms); Horphag Research, 
Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that designing website so it would 
appear as search result when web user searches using another’s trademarked name is trademark 
infringement); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); 
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What does this mean for consumers, other businesses, and the future of 
trademark law? 
The benchmark of trademark infringement in the United States 
traditionally has been a demonstration that consumers are likely to be 
confused by the use of a similar or identical trademark to identify the 
goods or services of another.2  Trademark law in the United States is 
primarily a statutory matter governed by the Lanham Act.3  Under the 
Lanham Act there can be a finding of trademark infringement or unfair 
competition only if a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception is 
demonstrated.4 
Despite this clear requirement, several courts have held that 
defendants can be held liable for trademark infringement absent such a 
showing.  This has been especially true in decisions involving the 
Internet.  For example, courts have allowed findings of trademark 
infringement and unfair competition simply because a defendant 
designed a website so that the website would appear as a search result 
when another business’s trademarked term was entered into a search 
engine.5  Some courts have also held defendants accountable for selling 
or displaying sponsored advertising or pop-up advertisements that are 
linked to a search for a trademarked term without requiring a showing 
of confusion or in circumstances where any initial confusion is likely to 
be quickly remedied.6   
 
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that non-confusing search results that were listed when trademarked term was used as search term 
could be basis of trademark infringement).  
 2 For simplicity, reference to trademark(s) in this article encompasses both trade and service 
marks, as well as trade dress.   
 3 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).  All but a few trademark disputes are now decided 
under federal law in federal courts.  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.16 
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Trademark Review Comm’n, 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 
377). 
 4 See Lanham Act §§ 32(1), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2000).  The requirement 
of showing that a use of a mark is likely to confuse, mislead, or deceive is generally short-handed 
simply as showing a “likelihood of confusion.” 
 5 See, e.g., Horphag Research, Inc., 337 F.3d at 1040; Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d at 
465; Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064-66. 
 6 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that a search engine could be liable for initial confusion created by banner 
advertisement appearing on search results page); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, 
Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1393 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing infringement case to go forward 
against search engine for selling advertisements on website keyed to trademarked terms); Gov’t 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004) (same) (the district 
court subsequently issued an oral ruling granting Google’s motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, see Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1387 n.26); cf. 1-800 Contacts, 
Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding software company liable under an initial interest confusion theory for 
third-party pop-up advertisements); see also Stefanie Olson, Google Loses Trademark Case in 
France (Feb. 4, 2005), http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-5564118.html (French courts hold 
Google liable for breach of trademark for displaying rival’s ads keyed to search term). 
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The basis for these decisions is a court-created doctrine called 
“initial interest confusion,” which was first adopted over thirty years 
ago and has been vastly expanded in recent years with the advent of the 
Internet.  Courts have used this doctrine to hold that defendants have 
committed trademark infringement even when no one is ever likely to 
be confused by the use of the trademark.  Instead, courts have allowed 
findings of trademark infringement solely on the basis that a consumer 
might initially be “interested,” “attracted,” or “distracted” by a 
competitor’s, or even a non-competitor’s, product or service.7 
The creation and application of the initial interest confusion 
doctrine directly contravenes the Lanham Act, the goals underlying 
trademark protection, other intellectual property laws, and the First 
Amendment.  Application of initial interest confusion short-changes 
consumers and threatens fair competition.  In the iTunes example, why 
shouldn’t you be given a choice of other online music stores when you 
enter “itunes” into a search?  When presented with search results other 
than Apple’s iTunes, would you be confused?  Certainly not.  Might 
you be diverted from iTunes to a competitor’s software or music 
service?  Yes.  But providing consumers such choices and allowing 
businesses to produce and advertise similar products has traditionally 
been considered fair competition.  Such competitive practices form the 
foundation of our free market economy. 
Although trademark law was intended to assist businesses in 
identifying and distinguishing their goods from those of others, 
trademark law was never meant to give monopoly rights over the use of 
marks to trademark holders, especially at the expense of the greater 
public good.  Application of the initial interest confusion doctrine 
prevents comparative advertisements, limits information available to 
consumers, and shuts down speech critical of trademark holders and 
their products and services.  The initial interest confusion doctrine 
undermines the free market system under a misguided notion that 
competition in and of itself is unfair. 
Almost every federal circuit has adopted the initial interest 
confusion doctrine,8 and more and more trademark cases are being 
 
 7 See discussion infra Parts II.A & II.B and note 57. 
 8 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., No. 6:92CV00460, 1992 WL 436279, at *24 (M.D.N.C. 
Dec. 1, 1992) (applying initial interest confusion in 4th Circuit); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 
141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 
(6th Cir. 2003); Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. 
  The First Circuit has never explicitly adopted initial interest confusion, and has suggested 
that trademark infringement should not be found on the basis of confusion that occurs prior to the 
time of sale.  See Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 8, 17 n.4 (1st Cir. 
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decided on initial interest confusion grounds.  Only a handful of courts 
have questioned the doctrine, and no court has explicitly rejected it.9 
The recent proliferation of initial interest confusion cases is driven 
primarily by the development and prominence of the Internet.  Prior to 
the consideration of trademark infringement online, the initial interest 
confusion doctrine only rarely appeared as the basis for finding 
trademark infringement—there were fewer than a dozen published cases 
relying on the doctrine before 1990.10  In dramatic contrast, between 
 
2004) (not addressing initial interest confusion issue raised below in reversing district court 
decision); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (declining “to enter 
the ‘initial interest confusion’ thicket”); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 
718 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1993) (limiting confusion analysis to time of purchase); see also 
Benchmark v. Benchmark Builders, Inc., No. CIV. 00-151-PH, 2000 WL 1886570, at *6 (D. Me. 
Dec. 29, 2000) (“[T]he First Circuit, while not expressly rejecting the doctrine of initial-interest 
confusion, has indicated that confusion must be found likely at point of purchase to be actionable 
under Lanham Act.” (citing Astra, 718 F. 2d at 1207)); Northern Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern 
Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D. Mass. 2000) (“[I]nitial confusion . . . is not cognizable 
under trademark law in the First Circuit.”); CCBN.com, Inc. v. c-call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 
106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999) (considering initial confusion irrelevant unless it translates into “actual 
confusion in purchasing parties’ products”).  But see EMC Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 59 F. 
Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D. Mass. 1999) (considering initial interest confusion theory). 
  The Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal circuits have not decided the issue.  See, 
e.g., Weiss Assocs. v. HRL Assocs., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Northland Ins. Cos. v. 
Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119-20 (D. Minn. 2000) (noting that Eighth Circuit has not yet 
decided whether initial interest confusion doctrine applies under Lanham Act). 
 9 See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc., 232 F.3d at 2 (declining “to enter the ‘initial interest confusion’ 
thicket”); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d at 1207-08 (limiting confusion analysis to time of 
purchase); Weiss Assocs., 902 F.2d at 1549 (declining to consider “initial confusion” theory 
referred to by Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in its opinion); see also Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 354 F.3d at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring) (calling for overruling of circuit precedent 
that held that there can be trademark infringement under an initial interest confusion theory 
absent likely confusion). 
 10 Based on a survey of published cases available on the Lexis and Westlaw databases from 
1962 until 1990, fewer than a dozen published cases, including those credited with inventing the 
doctrine, refer to and rely on a doctrine of  “initial confusion,” “initial interest confusion,” or 
“initial interest.”  See, e.g., First Nationwide Bank v. Nationwide Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 682 F. 
Supp. 965, 977 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (citing Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F.2d at 260, for the proposition 
that creation of “initial interest” was actionable trademark infringement); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. 
Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1336, 1347 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same) (case depublished and 
republished at 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4160), order vacated by 870 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F.2d at 260; Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. 
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975); Pegasus Petroleum, 229 U.S.P.Q. 890, 
894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Television Enter. Network, Inc. v. Entm’t Network, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 
244, 247 (D.N.J. 1986); Warehouse Rest., Inc. v. Customs House Rest., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 411, 
417 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (considering evidence of “initial confusion” as evidence of “actual 
confusion”); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. 634, 640 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977), rev’d, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979); Koopers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers Gmbh, 517 F. 
Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Blaw-Knox Co. v. 
Siegerist, 300 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D. Mo. 1968) (describing initial “interest” caused by “initial 
confusion” as possible basis for trademark infringement); cf. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary 
Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 (5th Cir. 1980) (referring to fact that marks might be 
“initially” confusing as evidence that trade dress of two marks is similar in design); Commc’ns 
Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1251 (4th Cir. 1970) (considering “initial 
confusion” between sound of marks as one factor in trademark infringement analysis); Safeway 
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1990 and today there have been more than 100 published cases 
considering “initial interest confusion.”  The expanded application of 
initial interest confusion has not, however, been limited to the Internet.  
As more and more trademark holders have prevailed using initial 
interest confusion arguments in the Internet context and the number of 
precedents has grown, the doctrine has been used, and will continue to 
be used, with increasing success offline.11 
No article to date has questioned the outright validity of the 
doctrine from its court-created origins in the 1970s.  In fact, a number of 
prominent treatise writers and scholars have expressly supported the 
doctrine.12  Some articles have questioned the application of the 
doctrine in the Internet context, primarily because of the ease of 
navigation online, but none have called for the doctrine’s wholesale 
rejection both on and offline.13  Prior works that have discussed initial 
 
Stores v. Suburban Foods, 130 F. Supp. 249, 251 (D. Va. 1955) (referring to “initial confusion” in 
context of confusion that was initial and not subsequently remedied).  There are even fewer cases 
if one eliminates duplicative cases involving district court and appellate decisions for the same 
case.  A number of cases during this time period refer to “initial confusion” (not “initial interest”), 
but dismiss it as not being a basis on which trademark infringement can be grounded.  See, e.g., 
Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), rev’d on other 
grounds, 769 F.2d 362 (6th Cir. 1985); Church of the Larger Fellowship, Unitarian Universalist 
v. Conservation Law Found., Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 869, 873 (D. Mass. 1983); Broad. Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 309, 318 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. 
Raytheon Co., 439 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 648 
P.2d 393, 395 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting findings of trial court with approval); Pa. Dutch Co. 
v. Pa. Amish Co., 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 379, 385 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
 11 See, e.g, Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 WL 
21056809, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003); Shell Trademark Mgmt. BV v. Canadian Am. Oil Co., 
No. 02-01365, 2002 WL 32104586, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002). 
 12 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS §§ 23:5, 23:6, 25:69, 25:76 (4th 
ed. 2005) (supporting initial interest confusion generally and Brookfield’s holding that allowed 
trademark infringement when there was no likelihood of confusion); James A. Rossi, Protection 
For Trademark Owners: The Ultimate System of Regulating Search Engine Results, 42 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 295, 327 (2002) (“applaud[ing]” adoption of initial interest confusion as a 
solution to online use of trademarks); J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters and 
Domain Names, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 231, 235-36 (2000) (supporting the 
initial interest confusion doctrine and taking credit for its application to the Internet) [hereinafter 
McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters]; Stanley U. Paylago, Trademark Infringement, 
Metatags, and the Initial Interest Confusion Remedy, 9 FALL MEDIA L. & POL’Y 49, 64-65 (2000) 
(supporting application of initial interest confusion online); Note, Confusion in Cyberspace: 
Defending and Recalibrating The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 
2410 (2004) (supporting the initial interest confusion doctrine, but suggesting that it should be 
limited online to competitive situations involving intentional deception); Rachel Jane Posner, 
Note, Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 505 (2000) (urging all courts to adopt initial interest confusion); 
see also Promatek Indus., Ltd., v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (Judge 
Posner, a noted scholar, joins a decision that endorses initial interest confusion). 
 13 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 507 (2005) (recent article criticizing logic of initial interest confusion in context of discussion 
about online searches, but leaving unaddressed broader application of initial interest confusion); 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 785, 815, 819-23 (2004) (criticizing recent cases applying initial interest 
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interest confusion, even those that have been critical of it, have also 
failed to fully consider the motives for adopting the doctrine and, 
therefore, have not provided a useful framework for reform. 
Reformulating the initial interest confusion doctrine is more than 
simply an issue of statutory interpretation.  In recent years, much of the 
expansion of trademark and other intellectual property laws stems from 
Congressional legislation at the behest of trade groups or corporations, 
representing the most powerful intellectual property holders, at the 
expense of smaller competitors and the public.14  Thus, even if courts 
back away from the erroneous initial interest confusion doctrine, 
Congress may nevertheless be encouraged to codify it.  It therefore is 
vitally important to understand why the doctrine is wrong as a matter of 
policy and why it represents an assault on the fundamental principles of 
trademark law. 
Determining the scope and validity of initial interest confusion 
requires consideration of a number of larger theoretical issues facing 
trademark law today.  The first is whether it is ever acceptable to trade 
off of the goodwill established by another.  Some have termed this the 
“free-rider” problem and have suggested that if a company builds up 
value in a particular product or service then no one else should be able 
to benefit from that accumulated value.  While initially appealing when 
framed in those terms, such a conclusion is short-sighted and, as I will 
discuss in more detail, contradicts long-standing trademark law 
principles.  Consider the role the company Federal Express (now 
FedEx) played in building a market for overnight shipping.  The word 
“FedEx” has now become a common verb or shorthand for speedy 
delivery services even when consumers use other shippers.  Should 
FedEx be able to prevent others from establishing their own overnight 
 
confusion to Internet but supporting application of doctrine more broadly as “an occasionally 
useful lens for assessing traditional infringement and unfair competition claims” when considered 
within broader likelihood of confusion analysis); David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, 
Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1035, 1064-65 
(2003) (supporting application of initial interest confusion offline but not online); Lisa M. 
Sharrock, Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine With the Lanham Act, 25 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 53, 73 (2003) (criticizing recent expansion of initial interest confusion, especially as 
applied to Internet, but concluding that “there exists a host of potential fact patterns for which the 
initial interest confusion doctrine is an appropriate vehicle of analysis” when limited to 
circumstances in which ultimate purchasing decision is affected); Erlend Bakken, Unauthorized 
Use of Another’s Trademark On the Internet, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3 (2003) (limiting 
criticism of initial interest confusion to Internet context); Bryce J. Maynard, Note, The Initial 
Interest Confusion Doctrine and Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1303 (2000) (same); Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever 
Happened to Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 643 (2002-2003) 
(same). 
 14 Consider the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 
(2000), the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298 §§ 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-28 
(1998), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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delivery services simply because it had the idea first and built up a 
market for such services?  Should competing services not be able to 
contrast themselves to FedEx but rather be required to operate in a 
vacuum, leaving consumers in the dark as to how the different services 
compare? 
Initial interest confusion raises another pivotal question for 
trademark law—what is the ultimate role of trademark protection?  Do 
trademark infringement and unfair competition actions under the 
Lanham Act serve primarily to protect consumers from being duped by 
unethical competitors, or do the actions primarily serve to shore up the 
business of individual trademark holders without regard to the best 
interests of consumers?  The recent expansion of the scope of trademark 
protection suggests a focus on protecting businesses, but the genesis of 
trademark law in the United States strongly suggests that consumers 
were also at the heart of the decision to provide legal protection for 
trademarks. 
The answer to these questions is tied up with an even more 
fundamental ontological question about intellectual property law: Are 
trademarks and trademark infringement actions about protecting 
property rights or are they about providing more limited rights akin to 
tort and unfair competition actions?  The resolution of this issue 
provides a conceptual framework for determining the legitimacy of both 
expansions and limits to the scope of trademark protection and will 
determine the shape and direction of trademark law in the twenty-first 
century. 
The future of initial interest confusion will also determine what the 
world of Internet commerce looks like.  The Lanham Act allows e-
commerce to look like a supermarket, providing consumers with a 
wealth of choices and product information.  When you enter a 
supermarket you might, for example, ask a clerk where you can find 
Grey Poupon.  You will then be directed to an aisle filled with many 
brands and types of mustard, as well as ketchup and other condiments.  
Once there, you might find yourself distracted, or attracted, to some 
other items, including some other brands of mustard.  You might notice 
a generic “Dominick’s” or “Safeway” brand mustard that’s half the 
price of Grey Poupon.  You might notice an imported mustard that’s 
twice the price of Grey Poupon but strikes your fancy.15  You might 
well leave the supermarket with something besides Grey Poupon, but 
you would not do so because of any confusion.  When applying initial 
interest confusion analysis, courts are deciding that Internet consumers 
should not have such choices. 
 
 15 Grey Poupon, despite the French name, is produced in the United States by Kraft Foods, 
Inc. 
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But it is not just online businesses and consumers who are affected. 
If the doctrine of initial interest confusion is left unchecked, it will 
certainly alter the offline world as well.  Competitors will not be able to 
compare their products with other businesses’ trademarked goods or 
services; companies that repair trademarked products or resell 
trademarked goods will not be able to advertise or perhaps even inform 
customers of their services.  At the extreme, supermarkets could be 
required to organize their aisles alphabetically by trademark name, 
rather than by category of product.  Imagine a world in which you want 
to find raisin bran and need to decide in advance whether you want 
Kellogg’s or Post’s and then must look in the “K” aisle before Kleenex 
tissues and Kraft macaroni and cheese if you decide on Kellogg’s. 
This Article provides a wake-up call to courts, Congress, the online 
and offline business communities, and the public.  Initial interest 
confusion must be revisited and replaced.  In Part I of the Article, I 
briefly review the origins of initial interest confusion, and the few most 
important cases from which it developed.  This background provides an 
important foundation for analyzing the vast expansion of the doctrine in 
recent years and the problems that accompany it. 
Part II of the Article examines the current and foreseeable 
problems caused by the adoption and application of the initial interest 
confusion doctrine.  This part focuses on the doctrine’s conflict with 
basic trademark and unfair competition principles, other intellectual 
property laws, and the First Amendment. 
Part III considers the motivation behind the courts’ creation and 
expansion of the doctrine.  The courts’ initial motivation for adopting 
initial interest confusion was a legitimate effort to prevent baiting and 
switching practices.  However, since then courts have unreasonably 
stretched the doctrine to cover many circumstances which should be 
considered fair competition or which are better addressed by other 
existing statutes.  
Part IV explains why both the statutory and nominative fair use 
defenses do not provide an adequate remedy to the dangers created by 
the application of the initial interest confusion doctrine. 
Part V presents a proposal to replace the initial interest confusion 
doctrine with a narrower consideration of “pre-sale confusion.”  The 
mere diversion of a consumer to another product or service should not 
be used as a basis to find trademark infringement or unfair competition.  
Pre-sale confusion must entail proof of likely confusion that is more 
than de minimis, must be limited to potential purchasers, and must 
consider the complete array of factors traditionally examined in the 
likelihood of confusion analysis.  Finally, I discuss possible structural 
changes to the World Wide Web (the “Web”), and in particular to 
search engines, that will remedy some of the most vexing Internet-based 
  
114 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:1 
problems that courts have tried to address by relying on the misguided 
initial interest confusion doctrine. 
 
I.     BRIEF HISTORY OF INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION 
 
While it is not necessary or particularly useful to catalogue every 
initial interest confusion case, there are three primary cases that are 
worth analyzing in some detail because they highlight the logic behind 
the adoption of the doctrine and trace the doctrine’s expansion. 
 
A.     Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. 
Steinway & Sons 
 
Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & 
Sons16 is a Second Circuit case often credited with coining the term 
“initial interest confusion.”17  In Grotrian, a dispute arose from the use 
of the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name on pianos imported from Germany 
and sold in the United States.  The plaintiff, Steinway & Sons, 
contended that the mark infringed its Steinway mark for pianos.18  The 
case’s complexity stems from the fact that the Grotrian-Steinweg pianos 
had a historical relationship with the Steinway pianos.  In 1835, 
Heinrich E. Steinweg, the founder of Steinway & Sons, began making 
pianos in Germany under the name Steinweg.  In 1850 he emigrated to 
New York, changed his name to Steinway and began selling pianos 
under the name Steinway & Sons.  His oldest son, C.F. Theodor 
Steinweg, remained in Germany and continued making pianos under the 
Steinweg name.  In 1866, Theodor sold his business to his three 
employees, Wilhelm Grotrian, Adolph Helfferich and H. G. W. Schultz, 
and moved to the United States to join his father at Steinway & Sons.  
As part of the sale of the piano business to Grotrian et al., Theodor gave 
his successors the right to use the name “Steinweg.”19  The new owners 
 
 16 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 17 Neither the circuit court nor the district court used the term “initial interest confusion.”  
Instead, the district court referred to “initial interest” and the appellate court referred to both 
“initial interest” and “initial confusion.”  See id. at 1341-42; Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).  In Blaw-Knox Co. v. Siegerist, 300 F. Supp. 507, 513 (E.D. Mo. 1968), aff’d, 
414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969), the court used the term “initial confusion” prior to Grotrian and 
discussed the unfairness of using initial confusion, even if ultimately remedied, to divert business 
away from a plaintiff.  Although the analysis of Blaw-Knox is similar to Grotrian and later initial 
interest cases, it is rarely cited and did not use the term “initial interest.” 
 18 Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1334. 
 19 Id. at 1333-34.  The name of the Steinweg company was eventually changed to “Grotrian, 
Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf,” which was the name of the company at the time of the 
litigation.  There was a dispute over whether the right to use the name Steinweg was limited to 
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of Steinweg sold their pianos in Germany under the “Grotrian-
Steinweg” mark.20 
When Grotrian began selling pianos under the Grotrian-Steinweg 
mark in the United States, Steinway & Sons threatened to sue for 
trademark infringement.21  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that even though there was no confusion as to who manufactured the 
piano at the time of sale, a customer might initially think there was 
some relationship between Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway & Sons.22  
The court was confident that consumers would not be confused at the 
time of purchase because piano purchasers were highly sophisticated, 
the product very expensive, and the appearance of the marks in context 
quite different.23  Nevertheless, both the district court and the Second 
Circuit concluded that Grotrian had infringed Steinway’s trademark 
because people would be more likely to buy the Grotrian-Steinweg 
piano under the logic that Grotrian would be afforded credibility early 
in the transaction as a result of a consumer’s positive mental 
“association” with “Steinway.”24  The district court found that Grotrian 
had committed trademark infringement because consumers were 
“[m]isled into an initial interest” in the Grotrian-Steinweg pianos 
because of “subliminal confusion” as to the companies’ relationship.25  
The Second Circuit adopted similar language in affirming the district 
court’s opinion: 
The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a 
Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway. . . .  The 
harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing 
the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some connection 
with “Steinway,” would consider it on that basis.  The “Grotrian-
Steinweg” name therefore would attract potential customers based 
on the reputation built up by Steinway . . . .  The harm to Steinway in 
short is the likelihood that potential piano purchasers will think that 
there is some connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and 
Steinway pianos.  Such initial confusion works an injury to 
Steinway.26 
 
ten years or was an unlimited grant.  Id. at 1334 & n.2.  For purposes of this discussion, I will 
assume that it was an unlimited grant of use of the name because the court did not resolve that 
issue in holding that the use was infringing. 
 20 Id. at 1334. 
 21 The history of the litigation is quite complex and spans nearly fifty years.  Grotrian 
ultimately brought a declaratory action that went to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to 
establish its right to use the Grotrian-Steinweg name.  Id. at 1334-35. 
 22 Id. at 1339-42. 
 23 Id. at 1337-42. 
 24 Id. at 1340. 
 25 Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (emphasis added). 
 26 Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1342 (emphasis added). 
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The holding in Grotrian opened the door to finding trademark 
infringement in circumstances where there was no likely confusion and 
consumers merely became interested in a product because of an 
association with or reference to another’s trademark.  The court could 
have relied solely on the likelihood of confusion prior to the time of sale 
as a basis for its holding, but instead used language that greatly 
expanded the possible grounds for a finding of trademark infringement.  
The court’s ultimate decision makes sense if there was likely confusion 
as to whether there was some business affiliation or sponsorship of the 
Grotrian-Steinweg pianos by Steinway, but it is incorrect to the extent it 
prevented accurate statements about the historical link between the two 
companies from being made.  This troubling aspect of the holding has 
led to the odd situation today in which the German Grotrian-Steinweg 
website accurately describes the history of the company and its 
connection with the Steinway family, while the English language 
version of the site does not refer to this truthful information, presumably 
to avoid liability for causing initial interest confusion.27 
 
B.     Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp. 
 
The initial interest confusion doctrine did not gain much of a 
following in the years after Grotrian.  To the extent that the initial 
interest confusion holding from Grotrian was cited, it was primarily 
confined to courts within the Second Circuit.28  The next significant 
case to rely on initial interest confusion is Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus 
Petroleum Corp.29  This Second Circuit decision has been widely cited 
to support the doctrine.  In Pegasus Petroleum, the defendant company, 
Pegasus Petroleum, owned by Gregory Callimanopulos, was held liable 
 
27 Compare Grotrian Pianos, http://www.grotrian.de/grotrian_d/html/mehr/firma_mehr.htm 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2005), with Grotrian Pianos, www.grotrian.de/grotrian_e/html/mehr/ 
firma_mehr.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
 28 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 
1986) (citing Grotrian to support finding of post-sale confusion as basis for infringement); Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 229 U.S.P.Q. 890, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (relying on 
initial interest confusion doctrine from Grotrian); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, 
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Grotrian for proposition that attraction 
to competitor is basis for trademark infringement action); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of 
Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Grotrian for proposition that 
consumers do not need to be confused at time of purchase for there to be trademark 
infringement); West & Company, Inc. v. Arica Institute, Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. 32, 36 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (citing Grotrian for proposition that confusion is actionable even if resolved by time of 
purchase).  One case to apply Grotrian’s initial interest confusion doctrine outside the Second 
Circuit early on was Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1981), in 
which a district court in the Third Circuit cited Grotrian for the proposition that “subliminal 
confusion” is actionable.  Id. at 844 (emphasis added). 
 29 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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by the Second Circuit on initial interest confusion grounds for 
infringing Mobil Oil’s flying horse and other trademarks by adopting 
the name Pegasus Petroleum for his oil trading business.  After 
launching his business, Callimanopulos sent a letter to 400-500 people 
in the oil trading business informing them about Pegasus Petroleum and 
stating that the company was part of the “Callimanopulos group of 
companies.”30  Pegasus Petroleum never used a flying horse symbol 
similar to Mobil’s familiar logo.  Instead, Pegasus Petroleum used an 
interlocking double P as its logo.31 
The Second Circuit held that even though there was no chance that 
consumers would be confused at the time of purchasing the oil, Pegasus 
had committed trademark infringement because it was likely that 
“Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial credibility during the initial 
phases of a deal.  For example, an oil trader might listen to a cold phone 
call from Pegasus Petroleum . . . when otherwise he might not, because 
of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil.”32 
The decision in Pegasus may ultimately have been correct under 
the Lanham Act, not because of initial interest, but because Mobil had a 
trademark both in the flying horse symbol and in the name Pegasus for 
Mobil’s oil business.  Because of the similarity of the marks, confusion 
may have been likely under the traditional likelihood of confusion 
analysis.33 
 
C.     Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment 
 
Despite the development of the initial interest confusion doctrine in 
Grotrian and Pegasus Petroleum, few cases relied on the doctrine until 
the mid-to-late 1990s, and most of those that did still required a 
defendant to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.  In total, fewer than 
a dozen cases applied initial interest confusion until the 1990s.34  The 
rarely-used doctrine was resurrected and greatly expanded in Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.35  In 
Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit embraced the initial interest confusion 
analysis from Grotrian and Pegasus Petroleum, and explicitly held that 
the initial interest confusion doctrine could be used to find trademark 
infringement even if there is no likelihood of confusion.  The holding in 
 
 30 Id. at 258. 
 31 Id. at 256. 
 32 Id. at 259 (emphasis added). 
 33 Pegasus actually predates Mobil as the trademark for an early predecessor company of 
Mobil.  See Mobil & Pegasus, http://www2.exxonmobil.com/corporate/about/history/ 
corp_a_h_pegasus.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
 34 See supra note 10. 
 35 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Brookfield ignited a firestorm that has spread the initial interest 
confusion doctrine to nearly every federal circuit.36  Many trademark 
scholars have expressly approved of Brookfield, including J. Thomas 
McCarthy, author of the preeminent treatise in the trademark field.37   
The most troubling and often-cited holding from Brookfield is that 
the use of another’s trademarked term in the metatags for a website 
constitutes trademark infringement.  Before diving into the specifics of 
Brookfield, a brief digression into the workings of metatags and web-
based search engines is necessary.  Programmers use source code38 to 
construct webpages.  The source code of any webpage includes 
 
 36 See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 293 
(3d Cir. 2001) (citing Brookfield to support conclusion that initial interest confusion is 
actionable); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs. L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 250-58 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(same); Promatek Indus., Ltd., v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Brookfield to support trademark infringement holding on basis of use of trademarked term in 
website’s metatags); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(same); Northern Lights Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 (D. Mass. 
2000) (citing Brookfield to support conclusion that trademark infringement is more likely online 
than offline); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Brookfield to support application of initial interest 
confusion to use of another’s trademark in metatags and domain name); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight 
Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Brookfield to support 
application of initial interest confusion to domain name); BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star 
Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 210-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Brookfield with approval but 
distinguishing facts at hand); Bayer Corp. v. Custom School Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503, 
509 (E.D. La. 2003) (citing Brookfield to support conclusion that use of trademarked term in 
metatags was infringing); Comerica Inc. v. Fifth Third Bankcorp, 282 F. Supp. 2d 557, 573 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003) (citing Brookfield for conclusion that there is increased chance of initial interest 
confusion on Internet); Shepard’s Co. v. Thomson Corp. ex rel. West Group Div., No. C-3-99-
318, 1999 WL 777944, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 1999) (citing Brookfield as basis for liability 
under initial interest confusion theory); Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 
1246-47 (D. Minn. 2005) (supporting Brookfield, but allowing for fair use of plaintiff’s trademark 
in context of criticism); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (D. Minn. 
2000) (citing Brookfield with approval but limiting case’s holding to circumstances in which 
defendant stands to benefit financially); Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2D 
1751, 1755 (D. Kan. 2004) (citing Brookfield as basis for liability under initial interest confusion 
theory).  But see Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-36 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (calling for overruling of Brookfield and its holding that there can 
be trademark infringement absent likely confusion). 
 37 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 25:69, 25:76 (applauding Ninth Circuit for its 
decision in Brookfield and taking credit for having laid the framework that the Ninth Circuit 
adopted); 3A LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 21:12 (4th ed. 2004) (citing Brookfield without criticism, but suggesting several 
exceptions to holding); see also McCarthy, Cybersquatters, supra note 12, at 235-36 (supporting 
Brookfield decision and taking credit for the court’s application of initial interest confusion); 
Rossi, supra note 12, at 327 (“applaud[ing]” Brookfield); Paylago, supra note 12, at 49 
(supporting Brookfield); Posner, supra note 12, at 503 (calling for every court to adopt holding 
from Brookfield); Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at 812 (Judge Posner, a well-known scholar, signing 
on to a decision that endorses both initial interest confusion and Brookfield). 
 38 Source code is the programming language that is initially used by human beings to write 
computer programs.  Source code is then translated into object code, which contains a series of 
“0”s and “1”s that a computer uses to execute the source code.  See Webopedia, What is Source 
Code?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/source_code.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
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metatags, which are HTML39 commands that describe the content of a 
webpage.40  The most common metatags are description and keyword 
metatags, which are used to describe the website and to list keywords 
that relate to the site in order to assist search engines in locating the 
website.  Some search engines use metatags as a way of indexing 
material online.41  An average websurfer never sees metatags or the 
code of a webpage, although anyone using the web can use the “reveal 
codes” command to display the metatags and code for any webpage.42  
With this rudimentary background on metatags, I turn to the specifics of 
Brookfield. 
The plaintiff in Brookfield, Brookfield Communications, created 
and marketed software and services for professionals in the 
entertainment industry.43  After some success within the film industry 
community, Brookfield decided to expand its product to reach a 
“broader consumer market” with a new product under the registered 
mark “MovieBuff.”44  The MovieBuff software included searchable 
databases with movie credits, box office receipts, films in development, 
film release schedules, entertainment news, and contact lists with the 
names of industry professionals.45  Brookfield began selling its product 
online through its websites, moviebuffonline.com and 
brookfieldcomm.com, and provided a searchable online database under 
the “MovieBuff” mark for its subscribers.46 
 
 39 Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) is the computer language used to create documents 
on the Web.  See Webopedia, What is HTML?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/ 
HTML.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
 40 A “tag” is “[a] command inserted in a document that specifies how the document, or a 
portion of the document, should be formatted.  Tags are used by all format specifications that 
store documents as text files.”  Webopedia, What is Tag?, http://www.webopedia.com/ 
TERM/t/tag.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).  Unlike other source code used for a webpage, 
metatags describe the content of the page rather than provide the code for the page itself. 
 41 Some search engines use webcrawler programs to retrieve webpages with metatags that 
match search terms entered by users.  Others create a list of terms that are considered similar to an 
entered term and seek out metatags that are similar to those terms.  Many search engines, 
however, including the popular Google, do not use metatags as a way to index their search 
results.  Fewer search engines use metatags today than did at the time Brookfield was decided.  
Google, for example, determines the rank of search results based in part on how many other sites 
link to that site—a sort of online popularity contest.  David Krane, as quoted in David Becker, 
Google Caught in Anti-Semitic Flap (Apr. 7, 2004), http://news.com.com/2100-1038_3-
5186012.html; M. Totty, Cat and Mouse: As Google Becomes Web’s Gatekeeper, Sites Fight To 
Get In, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A1; see also discussion infra Part III.B.3.b. 
 42 To “reveal codes” using Internet Explorer, go to the “View” menu and select “Source.” 
 43 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 
1999).  These software applications allowed film industry professionals to track screenplay 
submissions, industry credits, and contacts.  Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1042. 
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The defendant, West Coast, owns one of the nation’s largest video 
rental stores, West Coast Video.47  West Coast had a searchable 
entertainment database on its website, westcoastvideo.com.48  The 
purpose of the database was to help West Coast’s customers locate 
movies to rent.49  West Coast used the word “moviebuff” in the 
keyword and description metatags for its website.50  West Coast alleged 
that it used the term “moviebuff” in its metatags because its 
trademarked slogan was “The Movie Buff’s Movie Store;” West Coast 
may also have used the term simply to refer to the generic term for 
movie enthusiasts.51  Because of the use of “moviebuff” in West Coast’s 
metatags, some search engines listed West Coast Video’s website as a 
search result when a user searched for the term “moviebuff.”52 
The Ninth Circuit held West Coast liable for trademark 
infringement because Brookfield’s “moviebuff” trademark appeared in 
the metatags for its website.53  The court admitted that a consumer 
reviewing the search results was not likely to be confused.  In the 
examples of search engine results considered by the court, the link to 
West Coast’s website was clearly marked as “westcoastvideo.com” and 
was listed further down on the results list than the Brookfield website so 
that a person reviewing the “hits” in order would see Brookfield’s 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 1042-43, 1059.  At the time the complaint was filed, West Coast also had a website at 
moviebuff.com.  Id. at 1042.  Part of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Brookfield involved a dispute 
over who had priority over the trademark “moviebuff” and whether West Coast could use 
“moviebuff” as part of a domain name for one of its websites.  The court ultimately held that it 
could not.  Id. at 1043.  This aspect of the decision relies on some questionable logic, but I focus 
my analysis only on the court’s holding regarding West Coast’s use of the trademarked term 
“moviebuff” in the metatags for its “www.westcoastvideo.com” website. 
 49 Id. at 1042-43.  In fact, West Coast still includes such a search engine on its website, as do 
many other Internet websites.  Compare West Coast Video, http://www.westcoastvideo.com (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2005), with Hollywood Video, http://www.hollywoodvideo.com (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2005), and The Internet Movie Database (IMDb), http://www.imdb.com (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2005) (also offering free movie databases). 
 50 Id. at 1043, 1061.  Today the West Coast Video website uses as its metatags the following: 
<meta name=“Keywords” content=“movies dvds dvds videos vhs tla video movie 
discount reviews  hollywood actor actors animation criterion cannes independent film 
festival buy movie star sundance films director cinema”> <meta  name=“Description” 
content=“Videos, movies and DVDs at tlavideo.com. Your online movie source for 
independent, international and Hollywood films, discount movies and animation.”> 
See West Coast Video, http://www.westcoastvideo.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).  Under the 
Ninth Circuit’s logic in Brookfield, suits could be forthcoming from Hollywood Video, Sundance, 
and the Cannes Film Festival, among others.   
 51 No evidence was presented that West Coast included the database for the purpose of 
competing with Brookfield’s MovieBuff product.  In fact, West Coast claimed to be unaware of 
Brookfield’s trademark and product.  Id. at 1059. 
 52 Id. at 1061-62.  Because West Coast’s website at the time referred to its trademarked 
slogan, “The Movie Buff’s Movie Store,” id. at 1042, some search engines might have 
independently pulled up the website regardless of the use of the term “moviebuff” in West 
Coast’s metatags. 
 53 Id. at 1062-66. 
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website first.54  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that West Coast 
committed trademark infringement by using the term “moviebuff” in its 
metatags.  The court concluded that even though consumers were never 
likely to be confused, a finding of trademark infringement was 
appropriate because consumers might be “divert[ed]” to another 
website; this diversion might cause Brookfield to lose out on some 
business because customers might be satisfied with the free searchable 
database available on West Coast’s website.55 
The court in Brookfield justified its conclusion, that one could find 
trademark infringement absent a showing of likely confusion, on the 
basis of the initial interest confusion doctrine: 
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers 
know they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there 
is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using 
‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for 
‘MovieBuff’ to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from the 
goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark.56 
The court’s conclusion that such diversion is improper competition 
and constitutes trademark infringement is wrong both as a matter of 
statutory construction and as a matter of policy for reasons that I will 
discuss in more detail in the next section. 
The three cases I have discussed trace the initial interest confusion 
doctrine’s evolution from “initial confusion” or confusion that occurs 
prior to the time of sale, to “initial interest” involving “possible” 
confusion, and then to “initial interest” absent any likely confusion.  
This progression has created the troubling state of the law in which 
defendants can be held liable for trademark infringement absent a 
showing of a likelihood of confusion.   
 
II.     CRITIQUE OF INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION 
 
Some courts use the term “initial interest confusion” to mean two 
different things: (1) confusion prior to the time of sale; and (2) initial 
interest regardless of any likely confusion.  When used in the latter 
circumstances the term “initial interest confusion” is truly a misnomer.  
Allowing trademark infringement actions on the basis of confusion 
occurring prior to the time of sale is sometimes justifiable under the 
Lanham Act and the principles behind trademark law; however, 
allowing a finding of trademark infringement when there is no likely 
consumer confusion has no basis in the law or policies that support 
 
 54 Id. at 1062-63. 
 55 Id. at 1062 (emphasis added). 
 56 Id. (emphasis added). 
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trademark protection.  The bulk of my criticism of initial interest 
confusion is directed at the use of the term when there is no finding of 
likely confusion, but instead only a finding of initial interest.  Allowing 
trademark infringement or unfair competition actions in such 
circumstances violates the plain language of the Lanham Act, 
contravenes the goals and logic behind protecting trademarks, harms 
free and fair competition, limits public information and consumer 
choices, and violates the First Amendment.  Even when initial interest 
confusion is applied in circumstances in which there is possible 
confusion, the application of the doctrine (as opposed to the traditional 
likelihood of confusion analysis) unfairly puts defendants at greater risk 
of being found liable for trademark infringement, conflicts with other 
intellectual property laws, and in some instances may also violate the 
First Amendment.  I will address each of these concerns in turn. 
 
A.     Initial Interest Confusion Violates the Lanham Act 
 
Despite the clear requirements of the Lanham Act, courts applying 
initial interest confusion in trademark actions have ignored the need to 
find a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.  Numerous courts 
have allowed findings of trademark infringement simply on the basis 
that a consumer may be “attracted,” “distracted,” “interested,” or 
“diverted” by other choices.57  The finding of trademark infringement in 
 
 57 See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th Cir. 
2004) (defining initial interest confusion as capturing “initial consumer attention”) (emphasis 
added); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
infringement where there was no likely confusion under initial interest confusion theory); 
Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing liability 
under initial interest confusion theory when consumers are “lured” or “diverted” to another site 
regardless of degree or duration of any potential confusion) (emphasis added); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding infringement where there 
was no likely confusion under initial interest confusion theory); Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. 
Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that initial interest confusion applies 
even if “customer is never confused”); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (finding initial interest 
confusion when there is no “source confusion” because people might be “divert[ed]” to another 
website) (emphasis added); Dr. Seuss Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 
1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “initial consumer attention . . . may still be an infringement”) 
(emphasis added); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 
1396 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Brookfield and Netscape for support of proposition that there can 
be trademark infringement on the basis of “diverting or capturing the consumer’s initial attention” 
even though “the consumer does not experience confusion”) (emphasis added); Montblanc-
Simplo GmbH v. Aurora Due S.r.L., 363 F. Supp. 2d 467, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Initial interest 
confusion occurs when a purchaser, while fully aware of the source of the product, is attracted to 
the junior user’s product because of the competitor’s use of a mark similar to that held by the 
senior user.”) (emphasis added); Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1751, 
1755 (D. Kan. 2004) (allowing liability for initial interest confusion absent showing of confusion 
on the basis of diversion); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 311 F. Supp. 2d 
690, 723 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“[T]his doctrine applies where the defendant’s ‘use of another’s 
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such circumstances—in which potential purchasers are never likely to 
be confused—violates the very statute that gives courts the authority to 
enforce federal trademark and unfair competition laws. 
The Lanham Act expressly limits trademark infringement and 
unfair competition actions to circumstances in which a defendant’s use 
of another’s mark, or a colorable imitation of that mark, is “likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”58  The purpose of 
the Lanham Act as set forth in Section 45 of the Act is to regulate 
“deceptive and misleading use[s]” and to prevent “unfair competition[,] 
fraud and deception.”59  Congress recently reaffirmed that the main 
 
trademark . . . is calculated to capture initial consumer attention . . . .’”) (quotations omitted) 
(emphasis added); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]nitial interest confusion occurs 
when potential consumers of one website [are] diverted and distracted to a competing website.” 
(quoting Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))) (emphasis added); March 
Madness Athletic Assoc., LLC v. Netfire, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 786, 812 (N.D. Tex. 2003) 
(“[D]iversion of traffic is known as initial interest confusion and can support finding of 
trademark infringement.”) (emphasis added); Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc., 
No. 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 WL 21056809, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003) (finding that being 
“initially [] attracted” was sufficient for trademark infringement) (emphasis added); Avlon Indus. 
v. Robinson, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ill 2003) (concluding that initial interest confusion 
occurs when consumer is “diverted”) (emphasis added); Electropix v. Liberty Livewire Corp., 
178 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (evaluating initial interest confusion based on 
attraction not confusion); BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (defining initial interest confusion as trademark infringement based on diversion 
and distraction); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 
2000) (finding initial interest confusion on basis of diversion rather than confusion); New York 
State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns, Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 
1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing initial 
interest confusion as situation in which consumer is “diverted to another Web site”) (emphasis 
added); Acxiom Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. Del. 1998) (finding trademark 
infringement on basis of “interest” not confusion) (emphasis added); Koppers Co. v. Krupp-
Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (finding likelihood of infringement 
based on “subliminal” confusion) (emphasis added); see also Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d 
1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2004) (focusing on likelihood of consumers being “diverted” rather than 
confused in analysis of sophistication of purchasers and consumer care) (emphasis added); Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (referring to “initial 
interest” as basis for trademark injury); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. 
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975) (considering “initial interest” and 
“subliminal confusion” as basis of trademark infringement) (emphasis added); Pegasus 
Petroleum Corp., 229 U.S.P.Q. 890, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (referring to attraction and initial 
interest as possible basis for finding trademark infringement); Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 5.6 (viewing 1962 amendment to Lanham 
Act as allowing infringement without a finding of confusion). 
 58 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2000).  Courts have held that the likelihood of confusion 
requirement is identical under sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act.  See Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 27-28 (2003); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780-81 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).  Section 43, the federal unfair 
competition action, encompasses situations in which there is a “false designation of origin, false 
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1125. 
 59 15 US.C. § 1127  (2000) (emphasis added). 
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purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect the public from “confusion and 
deception.”60  Diverting consumers through deceit and 
misrepresentation is not allowed, but diverting consumers by providing 
additional choices is permitted.  There is no basis for courts to disregard 
this statutory language by allowing trademark actions where there is no 
likely confusion.61 
 
B.     Initial Interest Confusion Contravenes Justifications for 
Protecting Trademarks 
 
In addition to violating the explicit requirements of the Lanham 
Act, application of initial interest confusion analysis undermines the 
justifications behind providing legal protection for trademarks.  
Statutory and common law protections for trademarks emerged from 
limited tort and unfair competition laws—not from a broad property 
rights scheme.  This difference is crucial because it indicates that there 
should be only narrow protection for trademarks.  Understanding the 
primary reasons for protecting trademarks is useful not only because it 
highlights how initial interest confusion contravenes the purposes of 
trademark law, but also because it provides guidance as to how to best 
address situations in which confusion exists prior to the time of sale. 
 
1.     Justifications for Protecting Trademarks 
 
Trademarks historically served to identify the manufacturer or 
sponsor of a good or provider of a service.62  Today, trademarks 
 
 60 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5577. 
 61 The unambiguous plain language of a statute governs its interpretation.  See Park ’N Fly, 
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory construction must begin 
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”); Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 
F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Where the statutory language is clear and consistent with the 
statutory scheme at issue, the plain language of the statute is conclusive and the judicial inquiry is 
at an end.”). 
 62 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 20 (1942) (“Trade-marks, 
indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing 
articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other.”); H.R. Rep. No. 76-944, at 3 
(1939) (“Trade-marks are merely a convenient way of distinguishing the goods of one trader from 
those of another.  By furnishing a means of identification, they perpetuate good will, and enable 
purchasers, by recognizing the marks, to buy again the goods which have pleased them before.” 
(citing McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877))); 100 CONG. REC. S16,546-47 (daily ed. 
Nov. 19, 1987) (remarks of Senator DeConcini on Introduction of S. 1883); Trade-mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 
203, 204-05 (1942); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 cmt. b (1938); MCCARTHY, supra note 12, 
§§ 3.2-3.9.  
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primarily identify goods and services and distinguish them from those 
sold and provided by others, without regard to who actually 
manufactures them.63  For example, a consumer will recognize that 
Kleenex and Puffs are manufactured by different companies, but the 
average consumer probably has no idea who the parent companies are 
that manufacture either of the brands of tissues.  Current trademark law 
has also expanded to encompass the indication of sponsorship or 
affiliation, as well as of origin.64 
The congressional reports preceding the passage of the Lanham 
Act emphasize that the goals behind protecting trademarks are “to 
protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure 
to the business community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by 
preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those 
who have not.  This is the end to which this bill is directed.”65  Although 
Congress referred to the goal of protecting businesses by preventing the 
“diversion” of business, “diversion” in this context was limited to 
diversion caused by deception—primarily the deception caused by 
 
 63 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 167 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; 
WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS AND ANALOGOUS 
SUBJECTS 1 (1873); see also FRANK I. SCHECHTER,  THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 19, 149-50 (Lawbook Exchange 1999) (1925) (describing 
shift from focus on identifying origin of goods to identifying product itself). 
  In recent years a number of commentators have questioned whether trademarks still 
primarily identify products or services.  Trademarks have in some instances become the 
commodities themselves rather than signifiers of a producer of the good or service, or of the 
product itself.  For example, the Nike swoosh is valuable separate and apart from the running 
shoes that were first marked with the trademarked swoosh.  See generally Barton Beebe, The 
Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004) (describing evolution of 
trademarks from identifying source to identifying products to identifying trademarks themselves); 
Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 
1717 (1999) (same); Hon. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993) 
(same) [hereinafter Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive 
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400 
(1990) (same). 
 64 The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act amended 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) [Lanham Act 
§ 43(a)] to provide for a cause of action when the use of a mark, or false or misleading 
description or representation of fact, “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause, mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as 
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, [or] services.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125 
(emphasis added).  The expansion to cover confusion as to sponsorship, affiliation, or 
endorsement, however, predates this statutory change.  See, e.g., Control Components, Inc. v. 
Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 770 (5th Cir. 1980); AMP Inc. v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1184 (4th Cir. 
1976); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U. S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980).  Trademark infringement actions under section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 
have also been held to include confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation.  See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. 
v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1991); GTE Corp. v. Williams 
904 F.2d 536, 539 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 65 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3 (1945); H.R. REP. NO. 78-
603, at 3 (1943); H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3. 
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passing off one’s goods as those of another.66  In particular, Congress 
repeatedly highlighted that the Lanham Act had two main purposes: 
One [goal] is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in 
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it 
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants 
to get.  [The other goal is to protect a trademark owner’s investment] 
of energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product . . . 
from [the mark’s] misappropriation by pirates and cheats.67 
The first goal is to promote the welfare of consumers by assisting 
them to identify the source—and sometimes the affiliation or 
sponsorship—of goods and services.68  Trademarks serve to assist 
consumers in making intelligent purchasing decisions by distinguishing 
products and preventing consumers from being deceived.69  Regulating 
the use of marks allows an individual to know that when he purchases a 
certain product, he will get the same product, made with the same 
ingredients and of the same quality, every time.  The use of trademarks 
also protects the consumer by allowing him to readily identify the 
company or individual responsible for defective or dangerous goods.  
Simply put, consumer search costs are lowered when goods can be 
easily distinguished.70 
 
 66 The House Report leading up to the passage of the Lanham Act stated that “[t]he protection 
which is accorded is security against misrepresentation as to the origin of goods, by suppressing 
imitations which are calculated to mislead buyers into the belief that the goods of one maker are 
those of another.” H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 
78-603, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 19; H.R. REP. NO.76-944, at 2 (“A trade-mark only gives 
the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s goodwill against the sale of 
another’s product as his.” (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924))). 
 67 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 2; H.R. 
REP. NO. 79-2283, at 19; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2; see also S. REP. NO. 100-515 at 4 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580; 79 CONG. REC. 7872 (1946) (statement of Senator 
O’Mahoney); 100 CONG. REC. S16,546-47 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1987) (remarks of Senator 
DeConcini on Introduction of S. 1883); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-
64 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. 
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982). 
 68 See 79 CONG. REC. 7872 (statement of Senator O’Mahoney) (“The trade-mark or trade 
name is designed to give notice to the public that the commodity to which it is attached is 
produced by a particular producer.  Thereby the consumer knows that this particular producer is 
the one who has produced the material he seeks to buy.”); see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2; 
H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 19; H.R. REP. 
NO. 76-944, at 3. 
 69 See H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3; Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854 n.14; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a (1995); LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 167; Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE. L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) [hereinafter Landes 
& Posner, Trademark Law]; BROWNE, supra note 63, at 1185-87; see also supra notes 62, 63, 68. 
 70 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2 cmt. a, 9 cmt. c (1995); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2:5; LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 
166-68, 174; Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 69, at 270, 274-75; A. ALCHIAN & 
W.R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION & CONTROL 193 
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The second justification for protecting trademarks is to allow 
businesses to build their goodwill by encouraging consumers to 
recognize and ask for a company’s product by name.  A company’s 
goodwill is generally thought of as the good feelings and associations 
that it has built up in the minds of consumers with regard to its business 
or product.  Trademarks have often been considered symbols or 
signifiers of this goodwill.71  By protecting a business’s goodwill, 
trademark law provides incentives for business development and the 
continued production of high quality goods and services.72  
Nevertheless, the Lanham Act's protection of goodwill is limited in 
scope.  As the House Report leading up to the passage of the Lanham 
Act explains: “A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it 
so far as to protect the owner’s goodwill against the sale of another’s 
product as his.”73  Although trademark protection has expanded in 
recent years to include confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation, its 
limited scope remains.  The owner of a trademark should be able to 
prohibit the sale of another’s product only if the seller suggests that the 
product is made by the trademark holder or that it is sponsored by or 
affiliated with the trademark holder. 
There is also a third, though less-often mentioned, goal of 
protecting trademarks—the promotion of “fair competition” by leaving 
ample room for businesses to compete.74  Congress considered and 
valued the contribution to the marketplace that competing businesses 
make and did not intend to shut down such competition by adopting the 
Lanham Act.  Thus, trademark protection must provide breathing room 
for fair competition even at the expense of a trademark holder’s grip on 
a particular market. 
 
(2d ed. 1977); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 
(1989-1999). 
 71 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; see also Mishiwaka Rubber & 
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. 
Metcalf, 240 U.S 403, 412-13 (1916); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877); Trade-mark 
Cases, 100 U.S 82, 87 (1879). 
 72 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 1275 (“Trade-marks encourage the 
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which 
excellence creates.”); H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 1 cmt. e, 9 cmt. c (1995); LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra 
note 63, at 168; Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 69, at 270; Lemley, supra note 69, 
at 1688; BROWNE, supra note 63, at 1185-87; Carter, supra note 70, at 762. 
 73 H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2 (quoting Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)). 
 74 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274-75.  The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
suggests that there are three main goals of modern trademark law: “the trademark owner’s claim 
to the benefits of its good will, the interest of consumers in reliable indicia of source and 
sponsorship, and the right of other sellers to compete vigorously with the trademark owners in the 
marketplace.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. d (1995) (emphasis 
added). 
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When the use of a mark on a product is confusing, the two primary 
trademark goals work in harmony to protect consumers from being 
deceived and to shore up a business’s goodwill.  But a conflict arises 
when promoting consumer welfare harms a business’s competitive 
advantage.  For example, providing a consumer with more choices is 
likely to reduce a company’s market share and may weaken a business’s 
goodwill.  The history behind the adoption of the Lanham Act suggests 
that, when such a conflict arises, courts should favor the interests of the 
public over those of individual trademark holders.  The most compelling 
evidence of this preference for consumers is the simple fact that 
Congress chose the standard of likely consumer confusion as the test for 
trademark infringement, rather than a test focused on business losses by 
a trademark holder.75  The trademark acts and common law that 
preceded the passage of the Lanham Act also had consumer deception 
as the central test for trademark infringement.76  American trademark 
law originated from unfair competition law and the common law action 
for deceit.77  Liability under both turned not on business injury, but on 
proof that consumers had been or were likely to be deceived.78 
 
 75 The drafts of the Lanham Act and the congressional reports leading up to the statute’s 
passage stress the requirement that infringement actions be based on a showing of likelihood of 
consumer confusion.  See S. REP. NO. 79-1333; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603; 
H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944; see also Bartholomew Diggins, The Lanham 
Trade-Mark Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 147, 150 (1947).  The Lanham Act’s focus on consumers is true in 
spite of the fact that consumers do not have standing to sue for trademark infringement.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).  Some courts have also concluded that consumers cannot sue under the 
unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act, section 43, although the explicit language of 
the section does not foreclose such suits.  Compare Made in USA Foundation v. Phillips Food, 
Inc., 365 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004), and Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, 442 F.2d 686 
(2d Cir. 1971), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 76 The Trademark Act of 1870 prevented the registration of marks that were so similar to 
other marks as to be “likely to deceive the public.”  See Trademark Act, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 
(1870).  The Trademark Act of 1876 limited infringement to circumstances in which the use of an 
imitative trade-mark was “calculated to deceive the public.”  See Trademark Act, 19 Stat. 141 
(1876).  Many of the provisions of the 1876 act also required a demonstration of the “intent to 
defraud.”  By the time of the Trademark Act of 1881, very similar language to that which was 
ultimately enacted as part of the Lanham Act was used to prevent the registration of marks that 
“so nearly resemble[] some other person’s lawful trade-mark as to be likely to cause confusion or 
mistake in the mind of the public, or to deceive purchasers.”  Trademark Act, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 
502 (1881); see also Trademark Act, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 274 (1905) (formerly 15 U.S.C. § 85(b)) 
(precluding registration if “likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to 
deceive purchasers”); Trademark Act, ch. 332, 52 Stat. 638 (1938) (same); McLean, 96 U.S. at 
251; BROWNE, supra note 63, at 278.   
77 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1275; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 3; H.R. 
REP. NO. 77-2283, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3; CONG. REC. S16,546-47 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 
1987) (remarks of Senator DeConcini on Introduction of S. 1883, Trademark Law Revision Act 
of 1987); Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003); United Drug Co. v. 
Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 778 n.5 
(1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. d (1995). 
 78 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 2:8, 5:2; 23:1; ALTMAN, supra note 37, § 21:2; Robert N. 
Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark 
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 795 (1997); Diggins, supra note 75, at 148, 157, 190; Carter, 
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Moreover, even the second goal of the Lanham Act, the protection 
of a business’s goodwill, is ultimately about promoting consumer 
welfare.  A congressional report leading up to the passage of the 
Lanham Act highlights that it is in the “interest of the public that the 
businessman be protected in his reputation, and the consumer against 
fraud.”79  By providing incentives for businesses to keep up the quality 
of their goods and to improve their products and services, trademark 
law ultimately benefits the public.80  This logic can be seen in other 
areas of intellectual property.  For example, in copyright law, authors 
are given property rights in their creative works with the ultimate goal 
of providing incentives for creation so that more works will exist for the 
public to consume and build upon.81  The scope of an individual’s rights 
in his or her work is meant to be narrowly construed and should 
theoretically be limited only to protection that is necessary to maximize 
public welfare.82  Similarly, trademark protection should be construed 
narrowly with an eye on promoting the ultimate public good. 
Allowing a finding of trademark infringement on the basis of mere 
“initial interest” does not promote any of the goals of trademark law.  
One of the greatest dangers of initial interest confusion is that it is often 
used to deny consumers access to information about the goods and 
services offered by competing sellers.  Such information is crucial for 
the efficient operation of competitive markets and protects the public’s 
ability to choose between reasonably-priced products.  Application of 
initial interest confusion harms consumers by eliminating such choices 
and information without any compensating benefit. 
It is also questionable whether non-confusing references to 
another’s trademark actually harm a trademark holder’s goodwill.  A 
business’s goodwill is not likely to be damaged simply by the fact that a 
 
supra note 70, at 765. 
 79 H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2 (1939) (emphasis added).  The Senate Report accompanying 
the Trademark Law Revision Act expressly stated that it sought to “improve the law’s protection 
of the public from counterfeiting, confusion, and deception.”  S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 1 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5577. 
 80 San Francisco Arts & Athletics Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987) 
(protecting trademarks gives producer incentives to create quality product which “in turn, benefits 
the public”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. e (1995). 
 81 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994) (“The immediate effect of our 
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by 
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1986); Twentieth Century Fox v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975); see also Tasini v. New York Times, 533 U.S. 483, 523 n.20 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 82 Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (describing need to limit 
intellectual property protection in patent context); see also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food 
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965) (patent law must be narrowly construed to 
limit harms from affording monopoly). 
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non-competing, or even a competing, business provides consumers with 
other purchase options.  Nor is a trademark holder’s goodwill negatively 
affected simply because another company refers to its trademarked 
product.  A trademark holder’s sales may be impacted by such 
competition, but consumers’ feelings about the company, and the actual 
goodwill of that company are unlikely to be affected.  For example, if I 
search for an iTunes substitute, I do not think more or less of Apple as a 
company or its product simply because there are competing products 
that I can choose from.  If anything, the fact that the market for such 
software and online music is defined by the word “iTunes” reinforces 
my positive view of Apple as an inventive, trailblazing company.  If a 
company causes confusion as to whether it is iTunes by, for example, 
calling itself iToons or iMusic, and is a subpar service, the goodwill of 
iTunes and Apple might well be affected.  But in such an instance the 
traditional likelihood of confusion test would protect Apple.  When 
consumers are not confused, there is no need—even under the 
justification of protecting a business’s goodwill—to find trademark 
infringement. 
 
2.     Examples of How Initial Interest Confusion Harms 
Consumers and Prevents Fair Competition 
 
The following are examples of cases in which application of initial 
interest confusion contravenes the justifications for protecting 
trademarks.  Each scenario highlights a situation in which potential 
purchasers, legitimate businesses, and the public at large are worse off 
because of the application of initial interest confusion.  These cases 
highlight many courts’ focus on businesses rather than consumers, a 
misguided concern over free-riding, and the treatment of trademarks as 
property rights in gross rather than as limited indicators of source. 
 
a.     Direct Competitors 
 
Courts are most likely to find initial interest confusion when the 
defendant directly competes with a trademark holder’s business.  
Numerous courts have come to view references to another’s trademark 
by direct competitors as unfair.  Traditionally, businesses that sell 
similar or related products have been able to compare their goods to 
those of a trademark holder so that consumers can make informed 
choices about which product to buy.83  In fact, Congress emphasized the 
 
 83 See Charles D. Ossola & Carol Lally, Trademarks, Fair Use, & the First Amendment, 617 
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importance of promoting such choices when justifying the basis for 
protecting trademarks.84 
Not only in Brookfield, but also in several more recent cases, 
courts have suggested that a competitor cannot refer to another’s 
trademarked product on its website or even have its website and product 
appear as a search result when a consumer looks for a trademarked good 
online.  One such case is Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pelligrini,85 in 
which the defendant and the plaintiff both sold unpatented food 
supplements made from an extract of pine bark.86  The plaintiff, 
Horphag, registered its version of the compound in the United States 
under the name “Pycnogenol.”  The facts of the case are complicated by 
the fact that the defendant alleged that even though Horphag holds the 
trademark for Pycnogenol in the United States, that same trademark is 
held and has been used for many years in Europe and elsewhere by Dr. 
Masquelier and his licensees.87  Dr. Masquelier is the French scientist 
who first created the compound.  Horphag allegedly beat Dr. 
Masquelier to the U.S. market and laid claim to the Pycnogenol mark.88  
Because the mark Pycnogenol was not available in the United States by 
the time the International Nutrition Company, Dr. Masquelier’s U.S. 
distributor, sought registration of the product, it choose “Masquelier” as 
the U.S. trade name.89 
The defendant in Horphag, Mr. Garcia, was apparently a licensed 
dealer of the Masquelier version of the compound.  He sold Masquelier 
on his website, which accurately described the origins of Masquelier as 
 
PLI/PAT. 139, 145; August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 1995); Lindy Pen 
Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We have recognized that liability for 
infringement may not be imposed for using a registered trademark in connection with truthful 
comparative advertising.”).  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) encourages the use of 
comparative advertising.  See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b) & (c) (2004) (“Commission policy in the area 
of comparative advertising encourages the name of, or reference to competitors, but requires 
clarity, and, if necessary, disclosure, to avoid deception of the consumer . . . .  Comparative 
advertising encourages product improvement and innovation and can lead to lower prices in the 
marketplace.”). 
 84 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 85 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 86 The supplement is marketed as a natural antioxidant used to prevent or treat heart disease 
and strokes. 
 87 See, e.g, Excerpts of Record at 72, 86-121, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-
56733, 01-55142).  The original patent holder and inventor of the product was Dr. Masquelier, 
who named his invention Pycnogenol.  See U.S. Patent Nos., 3,436,407 (1969) and 4,698,360 
(1987).  (The patent had expired by the time of the litigation.)  In France, Portugal, Austria, 
Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, South Korea and numerous other countries 
the product is also sold under the trademark Pycnogenol.  Excerpts of Record at 86-121, Horphag 
Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 01-55142). 
 88 Id. at 86-121; see also Appellant’s Brief, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-
56733, 01-55142), 2002 WL 32103403. 
 89 Excerpts of Record at 86-121, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 01-
55142); see also Appellant’s Brief, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 01-
55142), 2002 WL 32103403. 
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being invented by Dr. Masquelier and sold under the Pycnogenol name 
outside the United States.  Garcia also accurately described that 
Masquelier and Pycnogenol are made of the same compound.  Garcia’s 
website clearly identified that it was not associated with the trademark 
holder, Horphag, or with Horphag’s trade brand product, Pycnogenol.90  
In addition to referring to Pycnogenol on his website, Garcia placed the 
term in the metatags for his website.  Because the term “Pycnogenol” 
was included on Garcia’s website and in the metatags for the site, search 
engines were likely to pull up his site as one of the search results when a 
websurfer used the term Pycnogenol. 
The Ninth Circuit panel that heard the case initially held that 
Garcia had committed trademark infringement both by referring to 
Pycnogenol on his website and by including the trademarked term in the 
site’s metatags.91  The first panel decision was withdrawn without 
explanation.  The amended opinion held only that the metatags were 
infringing and did not address the issue of whether the references on 
Garcia’s website were also infringing.92 
The holding that Garcia’s use of Pycnogenol in his metatags is 
infringing is problematic.  There are millions of websites available on 
the Web.93  If Garcia cannot use the Pycnogenol trademark in his 
metatags, the chances of anyone locating his site will be reduced.94  
Consumers should not be required to know the chemical compound of 
the product or that it derives from pine bark.  When a websurfer types in 
the term “Pycnogenol” to a search engine she should be able to pull up 
Garcia’s website as well as Horphag’s.  Consumers should be able to 
locate alternative products that are similar or, in this case, virtually 
identical.  Moreover, Garcia is selling the identical product sold as 
Pycnogenol in Europe; some websurfers may be aware of the foreign 
trade name and be searching for a product similar to or identical to the 
European product.  The Pycnogenol metatag also accurately describes 
the website because the website refers to the history of the product and 
 
 90 The website stated that  
[t]he original FRENCH Pycnogenol® and Horphag’s U.S. Pycnogenol® are NOT the 
same, Horphag’s U.S. Pycnogenol® “borrows’’ from the 50 years of research for 
Masquelier’s authentic and original FRENCH Pycnogenol® (now called 
MASQUELIER’s® in the U.S.).  Therefore, the original French Pycnogenol®, 
MASQUELIER’s® and this web site are neither endorsed, nor sponsored by, nor 
affiliated with Horphag Research, Ltd. 
Excerpts of Record at 86, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 01-55142). 
 91 Horphag Research, 337 F.3d at 1039-42. 
 92 See id. 
 93 Google claims that its search engine indexes more than eight billion webpages.  See 
Google, http://www.google.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
 94 Because search engines increasingly do not use metatags to locate search results, 
consumers may still be able to locate Garcia’s site using the search term “pycnogenol.”  See supra 
note 41 and discussion infra Part III.B.3.b. 
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the scientific studies that support its efficacy, both of which refer to 
“Pycnogenol.” 
The suggestion from the initial panel decision that Garcia could not 
refer to “Pycnogenol” on his website is even more troubling than its 
holding with regard to the metatags.  Garcia cannot accurately describe 
the Masquelier product and its origins without reference to Pycnogenol.  
Moreover, Garcia cannot refer to the research showing the efficacy of 
the pine bark extract without using the name “Pycnogenol” since all of 
the research was conducted using the brand name.  A similar situation 
arises with generic drugs, both prescription and over-the-counter.  
Without the ability to refer to the trademarked product by its trademark, 
it would be difficult, for example, to inform consumers that 
acetaminophen is a comparable substitute for Tylenol.  Competing 
businesses should be able to describe their products as being made of 
the same substance as a trademarked product if such statements are 
truthful and do not confuse consumers as to the source or sponsorship of 
the product. 
Horphag and similar cases in other circuits prevent competing 
online businesses from designing their websites so that consumers can 
find them and from providing truthful information about their products.  
Perhaps even more troubling, these cases suggest that when a 
trademarked term is entered into a search engine, results may have to be 
limited to search results from the trademark holder.  Several courts have 
already held that search engines may be liable for providing search 
results and online advertising based on search terms that include 
trademarks.  In Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications 
Corp.,95 the Ninth Circuit examined the use of keyed advertisements96 
and banner advertising97 on the Internet.  The defendant, Netscape, a 
search engine and web browser, sold advertising linked to its searches.  
In particular, Netscape sold an adult-oriented list of words, including 
the trademarked terms “playboy” and “playmate.”  When a user of the 
search engine typed in either of these words, advertisements would 
appear at the top or sides of the search results for adult-oriented 
websites.  According to the court, these ads were either not labeled or 
confusingly labeled.98  The court held that Netscape, in its capacity as a 
search engine, could be held liable for trademark infringement, on either 
a contributory or direct liability theory, for a banner advertisement 
 
 95 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 96 Keyed advertisements are ads that appear depending on the search term used by a 
consumer and are generally related to the subject of the search term or a relevant category of 
consumers. 
 97 Banner advertisements can be keyed or not keyed, but they appear at the top or sides of a 
search engine results page like a banner. 
 98 See id. at 1030. 
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produced by a third party and keyed to Netscape’s search results.99  
Fortunately, in contrast to many other initial interest confusion cases, 
the Netscape court suggested in dicta that if the advertisements had been 
clearly labeled so as to dispel likely confusion, there would not have 
been trademark infringement.100  Despite such dicta, the Netscape 
opinion cites Brookfield with approval for the proposition that diversion 
can be a basis for trademark infringement.101 
To the extent that consumers were likely to be confused as to the 
sponsorship of the banner advertisements and that such confusion was 
not likely to be quickly dispelled upon clicking on the advertisement, 
the ultimate holding in Netscape may be correct.  However, the court 
did not consider the likelihood that many Internet users know that ads 
on search engines are generally not associated, in a business sense, with 
the search results or search terms.  The court’s suggestion that Netscape 
needs to remove the terms “playboy” and “playmate” from its list of 
words to which advertisements are linked is particularly troubling.102  
The court essentially limits the ability of competitors in the adult 
website business, such as Hustler, to display their magazine on the same 
virtual newsstand shelf as Playboy.103 
Although ultimately concurring in the Netscape opinion, Judge 
Berzon’s separate opinion provides a strong dissenting voice against the 
finding of trademark infringement absent evidence of likely confusion.  
Judge Berzon’s concurrence emphasizes that comparison shopping and 
diversions are fair game in the brick and mortar world and should also 
be fair game on the Internet.104  In the brick and mortar world, when you 
enter a drugstore, for example, and ask for assistance locating Tylenol, 
you will likely be directed to the pain reliever aisle where you are free 
 
 99 See id. at 1024, 1029-31.  The court declined to decide which theory of liability applied.  
Id. at 1024; see also Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1385, 
1387, 1391 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing infringement case to go forward against search engine for 
selling advertisements on website keyed to trademarked terms); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. 
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (same).  But see 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 411 & n.15 (2d Cir. June 27, 2005) (distinguishing pop-up ads that 
court held are not trademark uses with keyed advertisements linked to search engine results); 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 749 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (concluding 
that pop-up ads are not infringing in part because consumers are likely to know ads are not 
affiliated with websites). 
 100 Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d at 1025 n.16. 
 101 Id. at 1028-30.  But see id. at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring) (calling for overruling of 
Brookfield). 
 102 Id. at 1029-31; see also Playboy Enters. v. Asia Focus, No. Civ.A. 97-734-A, 1998 WL 
724000, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (prohibiting, among other things, the use of the phrase 
“the playboy in all of us”). 
 103 The conclusion is also troubling because playboy and playmate are arguably generic terms.  
See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 902 (1987) (defining “playboy” as “a 
man who lives a life devoted chiefly to the pursuit of pleasure” and “playgirl” as “a woman who 
lives a life devoted chiefly to the pursuit of pleasure”). 
 104 Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
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to choose generic acetaminophen or Aleve instead of Tylenol.  Yet on 
the Internet, several recent decisions, such as Netscape and Horphag, 
prevent similar forms of advertising and comparison shopping online. 
The initial interest confusion doctrine’s significant limitation on 
consumer’s access to truthful information and a competitor’s ability to 
advertise its products and services is not limited to the Internet.  The 
overwhelming success in recent years by plaintiffs arguing initial 
interest confusion as a basis for liability has led to an increase in the 
successful application of the doctrine by plaintiffs offline.  For example, 
courts have found trademark liability under an initial interest confusion 
theory when consumers have associated one product with another’s 
trademarked good, even though consumers are not confused as to 
source, sponsorship or affiliation.  In Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry 
Creations, Inc.,105 a district court held that watches designed to look 
similar to Cartier watches could be found to infringe Cartier’s trade 
dress if consumers were initially “attracted” to the watches, even if 
consumers knew that the “knock-offs” were not Cartier watches.106  
This decision and others like it fly in the face of long-standing Supreme 
Court decisions holding that competitors can slavishly copy another 
company’s product so long as consumers are not confused as to the 
origin or sponsorship of the goods, and the products are not protected by 
copyright or patent law.107 
The application of initial interest confusion offline is broader than 
simply knock-off cases.  For example, in Shell Trademark Management 
v. Canadian American Oil Co., Inc.,108 Shell sued one of its franchisees, 
Canadian American, for selling a cheaper gasoline made by Touchless, 
as well as Shell gasoline at its gas station.  On the sign for the gas 
station both the Shell logo and Touchless logo were displayed.  The 
Shell pumps and the canopy over them were painted red and yellow 
while the Touchless pumps were off to the side and painted red and 
white.  The Touchless pumps had a sign on them making clear that 
“Touchless gasoline is not a Shell product.”109  Putting aside any 
potential contractual violations, Shell contended that “initial interest 
confusion,” which is “primarily [applied] in the Internet context,” 
prohibited the Canadian American gas station from selling both fuels.110  
While skeptical of applying initial interest confusion in this context, the 
district court acknowledged that the Brookfield precedent governed and 
 
 105 No. 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 WL 21056809, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003). 
 106 Id. at *11 (emphasis added). 
 107 See discussion infra Part II.E.  
 108 No. 02-01365, 2002 WL 32104586, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002). 
 109 Id. at *1. 
 110 Id. 
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allowed the case to go forward because there was a possibility of initial 
interest confusion.111 
 
b.     Related Competitors 
 
Even when companies are not in direct competition, courts have 
applied initial interest confusion to shut down advertising, product lines, 
and websites for related companies.  One such example is the Seventh 
Circuit decision in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,112 in which 
the court held that an herbal supplement manufacturer could not market 
a dietary supplement intended to combat depression under the name 
“Herbrozac” because the name infringed Eli Lilly’s trademark for the 
anti-depressant Prozac.113  The defendant, Natural Answers, developed, 
marketed and sold herbal dietary supplements called “Herbscriptions” 
which it posited as “drug alternatives.”114  Several of the Herbscriptions 
included names that readily conjure up more traditional medication 
brand names, such as Herbalium, Herbaspirin, and Herbadryl.115  
Despite the similarity between the Herbrozac and Prozac names, 
consumers were not likely to confuse the two products.  The product 
name for “Herbrozac” emphasizes the herbal nature of the supplement 
in contrast to the synthetic prescription medication, Prozac.  Both the 
packaging and the tablets for Herbrozac and Prozac looked dramatically 
different—Herbrozac was a large dark brown tablet with black specs 
and had a distinct herbal odor, while Prozac was, and still is, a small 
green and white pill.116  Herbrozac was clearly labeled as a dietary 
supplement and could be obtained without a prescription.  Each bottle 
of Herbrozac clearly stated that “[t]his product is not intended to 
diagnose, treat or cure any disease.”117 
Despite the fact that confusion was unlikely, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that Natural Answers had committed trademark 
infringement.118  The court noted that some pharmaceutical companies 
had expanded their lines to include dietary supplements, and that 
consumers might therefore think that Eli Lilly sponsored the herbal 
 
 111 Id. at *4-8. 
 112 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 113 Id. at 469. 
 114 Id. at 460. 
 115 Id.  At the time of the court’s decision, Herbscriptions were sold over the Internet but 
Natural Answers intended to expand to sell its products at retail outlets such as health food and 
grocery stores.  Id. 
116 Prozac also comes in several all-green versions.  See Drugs.com Pill Identification for 
“Prozac,” http://www.drugs.com/xq/cfm/pageID_1152/search_true/qx/index.htm (last visited 
September 10, 2005). 
 117 Natural Answers, 233 F.3d at 460. 
 118 Id. at 463-69. 
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supplement.119  If consumers were in fact likely to think that Eli Lilly 
made Herbrozac, the court’s conclusion might be supportable, but there 
are several indications that the court’s conclusion was instead based 
merely on initial interest.  First, the court’s analysis focuses on 
“divert[ing] consumers away from doctors by ‘having them go natural 
first and not go with drugs.’”120  This language suggests that the court 
focused less on the likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship than on the 
possibility that some consumers might choose to try the natural remedy 
instead of Prozac.121 
The Natural Answers court also held that Natural Answers’s use of 
“prozac” in the metatags for its website infringed Eli Lilly’s trademark 
on initial interest confusion grounds.122  The court’s conclusion with 
regard to the metatags is deeply flawed and perpetuates the erroneous 
logic of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brookfield that “[u]sing 
another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a sign with 
another’s trademark in front of one’s store.  As such, it is significant 
evidence of intent to confuse and mislead.”123  By using “prozac” in the 
keyword and description metatags to its website, Natural Answers is not 
misleading consumers—or more accurately the search engines and 
webcrawlers that help consumers locate websites.  The use of “prozac” 
in Natural Answers’s metatags accurately describes the website: The 
site explains that Herbrozac is an herbal food supplement that can 
reduce the symptoms of depression and is something consumers can try 
before resorting to prescription drugs such as Prozac. 
Like the search for products similar to iTunes, consumers should 
be able to look for something like Prozac, but not Prozac.  And like 
walking down the supermarket aisle, I should be able to ask for Tylenol, 
not acetaminophen, even if I want an alternative pain reliever.  
Consumers may well want to compare prescription anti-depressants and 
may not know the names of other drugs such as Wellbutrin or Zoloft.  
Even though Eli Lilly can and should be able to prevent others from 
misleading consumers into thinking that they are buying Prozac when 
they are really getting an herbal supplement or another prescription anti-
depressant, it should not be able to prevent consumers from considering 
alternatives to Prozac. 
The application of initial interest confusion also prevents providers 
of repair and maintenance services for trademarked products from 
 
 119 Id. at 462. 
 120 Id. at 464 (emphasis added). 
 121 To the extent that the court was concerned about the efficacy of  Natural Answers’s 
Herbrozac or thought that herbal supplements should be more heavily regulated, the proper venue 
for remedying that concern was before Congress, not through trademark law. 
 122 Id. at 465 (citing Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Video, 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th 
Cir. 1999)). 
 123 Id. (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064). 
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advertising and properly identifying their services.  For example, the 
Seventh Circuit in Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp.,124 held 
that Equitrac, a company that makes cost-recovery equipment and 
repairs similar equipment made by the plaintiff, Promatek, could not use 
the Promatek metatag to describe its website.  If Equitrac cannot use 
Promatek in its metatags, some search engines will be less likely to 
locate its website when consumers put in the search term “promatek.”125  
This means that consumers may be denied the opportunity to compare 
cost-tracking equipment and will be less likely to locate the full range of 
repair services available for their Promatek equipment.  If consumers 
using the search term “promatek” are not allowed to pull up any 
websites other than Promatek’s official site, it will be very difficult to 
locate other services that repair Promatek equipment.  This holding 
essentially gives Promatek a monopoly over repairs to its machines at 
the expense of consumers and other lawfully competing businesses.  
Moreover, like the other initial interest confusion cases, Promatek relies 
on a finding of trademark infringement where there is no likelihood of 
confusion. 
 
c.     Non-Competitors 
 
Courts have applied initial interest confusion to find trademark 
infringement even in situations in which the defendant is not competing 
with a trademark holder.  In these instances, the initial interest 
confusion logic has even less solid ground to stand on because 
confusion is much less likely and the trademark holder is unlikely to be 
harmed.  For example, a district court in New York held that Eric Louis 
Associates, a company that provides temporary placement services for 
accountants, could not provide a link on its website to the New York 
State Society of Certified Public Accountants (NYSSCPA) or use 
“NYSSCPA” in its description or keyword metatags.126  The placement 
service and the NYSSCPA did not compete for customers nor were 
consumers likely to think that NYSSCPA sponsored or was affiliated 
with Eric Louis Associates, the placement service.  Nevertheless, the 
court held that because an Internet user who was looking for the 
NYSSCPA might be momentarily diverted, though not confused, when 
 
 124 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 125 Because fewer and fewer search engines rely on metatags today, many search engines will 
still locate the site if the word “promatek” is used in the site’s text.  See supra note 41, discussion 
infra Part III.B.3.b., and infra note 293. 
 126 New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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Eric Louis Associates came up as a search result, there was trademark 
infringement under the initial interest confusion doctrine.127 
Initial interest confusion also has been applied in the parody 
context.  In Dr. Seuss Enterprises L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc.,128 
for example, the Ninth Circuit held that a humor book titled The Cat 
NOT in the Hat, about the O.J. Simpson trial written in the style of Dr. 
Seuss, infringed the trademark in Dr. Seuss’s Cat in the Hat under an 
initial interest confusion theory.129  The book clearly labeled itself a 
“parody,” listed the author as Dr. Juice and explained that the story was 
“As told to Alan Katz and Illustrated by Chris Wrinn.”  Putting aside 
any potential copyright and trademark dilution issues, there is little 
likelihood that a consumer would be confused into thinking that Dr. 
Seuss sponsored the work.  Yes, a consumer might be intrigued, 
attracted, or initially interested because of the reference to Dr. Seuss’s 
Cat in the Hat, but not confused.  Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
an injunction against the publication of the book because consumers 
might become interested in the book as a result of associating it with Dr. 
Seuss and thereby having more positive feelings towards the book.130 
The application of initial interest confusion to situations in which 
there is no competition highlights some of the doctrine’s greatest 
dangers: Businesses are unreasonably limited in their advertising, 
marketing, and products, and consumers are denied valuable 
information and choices.  At the same time, the trademark holder’s 
mark is in no jeopardy of losing its value or ability to distinguish its 
goods in the marketplace.  Moreover, reference to a trademark holder’s 
product can often be free publicity for the trademark holder and its 
product or service.  In the Eric Louis Associates case, the Eric Louis 
website made it more likely that the public would visit and know about 
the NYSSCPA site.131  Similarly, reading “Dr. Juice’s” book written in 
the style of Dr. Seuss’s writings might encourage people to read or 




 127 Id. at 342 (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1036, 1062). 
 128 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 129 There was also a copyright infringement action in the case.  I do not address the validity of 
the copyright claim in the case, but limit my analysis to the issue of trademark infringement. 
 130 Id. at 1405. 
 131 This is true not only because people might link to the NYSSCPA site from the Eric Louis 
site, but also because the more websites that link to a particular website the higher up in the 
search results a website often appears.  Google, for example, weights results based on the number 
of other sites that link to a particular website.  See supra note 41. 
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C.     Initial Interest Confusion Conflicts With Trademark 
Law’s First Sale Doctrine 
 
The initial interest confusion doctrine also conflicts with specific 
well-established principles in trademark law.  Trademark law, like 
copyright and patent law, provides that a consumer who purchases a 
good can freely resell that good without committing trademark 
infringement.132  Being able to resell goods necessitates the ability to 
advertise the sale of such goods.  The initial interest confusion doctrine 
severely limits the freedom of consumers to resell products.  By limiting 
the ability of businesses to use trademarks in metatags, domain names, 
and even on their websites, courts have made it very difficult to resell 
goods online.133 
If web users and websites cannot use trademarked terms to identify 
their websites or receive choices after having searched for a 
trademarked term, then the ability of consumers to resell their 
possessions will be greatly reduced.  For example, how can you 
describe the fact that you are selling your Nissan Altima without being 
able to refer to either Nissan or Altima?  Advertising a “mid-size 
Japanese car” will certainly not provide potential purchasers with 
sufficient information. 
The Sixth Circuit, in PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, 
L.L.C.,134 addressed the issue of the use of another’s trademark in the 
metatags, domain names, and text of websites that sold used trucks.  In 
PACCAR, the defendant, TeleScan, ran several websites that sold or 
linked to dealers that lawfully sold new and used Kenworth and 
Peterbilt trucks, trademarks held by the plaintiff PACCAR, the leading 
manufacturer of heavy trucks and truck parts in the United States.  
Some of these domain names included the Peterbilt or Kenworth 
trademarks, for example, “peterbiltusedtrucks.com” and 
“kenworthusedtrucks.com.”  TeleScan also used the terms Peterbilt and 
Kenworth in the metatags for its websites.  Each of TeleScan’s websites 
contained a disclaimer explaining that the website “provides a listing 
 
 132 See Davidoff & Cie, SA v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001); 
Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, 84 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996); Sebastian Int’l, Inc. 
v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995); Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. 
Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 593 (5th Cir. 1993); H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med. 
Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 24 cmt b. (1995); 4 ALTMAN, supra note 37, § 22.17. 
 133 See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 250-51 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(finding likelihood of confusion based on initial interest confusion when defendant used 
competitor’s trademark in domain names); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., No. 
CIV.A. 00-1111, 2002 WL 1301304, at *3-4 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002) (finding likelihood of 
confusion based on initial interest confusion when defendant’s website linked to dealers and 
sellers of new and used Caterpillar equipment and used “Caterpillar” in domain names). 
 134 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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service for name brand products and has no affiliation with any 
manufacturer whose branded products are listed herein.”135 
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the effect of the disclaimers because it 
deemed the case one of initial interest confusion in which disclaimers 
are irrelevant.136  The court rejected the “first sale” defense because 
there was initial interest confusion.137  The court left open the question 
of whether the use of the trademarked terms in the metatags was 
infringing.  Under the holding of Brookfield, however, the use of 
PACCAR’s trademark in the metatags would likely be considered 
infringing.138 
The PACCAR decision may ultimately have been correct because 
of some facts particular to the case: (1) the disclaimer was hidden and 
(2) background wallpaper on the websites used the trademarked terms 
Peterbilt and Kenworth, suggesting an affiliation or sponsorship with 
PACCAR.  In combination with the cases holding that any use of 
another’s trademark in metatags is infringing, however, PACCAR 
suggests that those who resell goods online may have difficulty 
directing consumers to their websites.  Resellers risk trademark liability 
for using the trademark of the product they wish to sell in their 
metatags, domain names and even possibly the text of their websites.  
Recent cases, like Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications, 
also suggest that online auction houses like Ebay could be held liable 
for trademark infringement by third-party resellers. 
 
D.     Application of Initial Interest Confusion Increases the 
Likelihood of Infringement Findings 
 
The initial interest confusion doctrine not only increases the 
number of situations in which an infringement claim can be brought, but 
it also makes it much more likely that a given defendant will be found 
liable for having infringed a trademark.  One of the reasons the initial 
interest confusion doctrine increases the likelihood of a finding of 
infringement is that some courts treat initial interest confusion as a 
confusion test separate and apart from the traditional likelihood of 
confusion analysis.139  This is particularly troubling given the otherwise 
 
 135 Id. at 248 (emphasis added). 
 136 Id. at 253.  See also discussion infra Part II.D. 
 137 Id. at 257. 
 138 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 139 See, e.g., PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 253 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 
F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2003), and Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Video, 174 F.3d 1036, 
1062 (9th Cir. 1999)); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis 
Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Corbond Corp. v. Core Foam, Inc., 356 
F. Supp. 2d 910, 917 (W.D. Wisc. 2005); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377, 2003 
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extensive weighing and balancing of numerous factors that make up a 
determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  
Determining whether something is likely to be confusing can be very 
amorphous; therefore, courts have developed a number of factors that 
are considered as part of the likelihood of confusion analysis.  These 
factors provide a clearer framework for assessing likelihood of 
confusion and they protect the public and defendants from overzealous 
trademark prosecution.140 
Under the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis, a court 
examines and weighs an array of factors to determine whether 
confusion is likely, including: 
(1) The strength of the plaintiff’s mark;141 
(2) the similarity of the marks;142 
(3) the similarity of the products;143 
(4) the likelihood that the prior trademark owner will bridge the gap 
between the products;144 
 
WL 22451731, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003); Golden West Fin. v. WMA Mtg. Servs., No. C 
02-05727, 2003 WL 1343019, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003) (“Initial interest confusion is a 
distinct harm, separately actionable under the Lanham Act.”); J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. 
Supp. 2d 1154, 1162-63 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“One type of actionable consumer confusion is known 
as ‘initial interest’ confusion.”); Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1094 
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (“[L]ikelihood of confusion can be shown on the basis of initial interest 
confusion.”), aff’d in part by Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002); Acxiom 
Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. Del. 1998); see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 
1054 n.16 (holding that the Ninth Circuit’s eight-factor likelihood of confusion test does not fit 
well in the Internet context and that initial interest confusion analysis is sufficient to determine 
trademark infringement); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 493 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering initial interest confusion both as separate analysis and as part of 
actual confusion and sophistication factors), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 140 Although these factors were meant to facilitate the determination of the complex question 
of whether likelihood of confusion occurs, what was said by Judge Friendly in 1961 remains true 
today: “The problem of determining how far a valid trademark shall be protected with respect to 
goods other than those to which its owner has applied it, has long been vexing and does not 
become easier of solution with the years.”  Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 
495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Stephen C. Root, Trade Dress, the “Likelihood of Confusion,” and 
Wittgenstein’s Discussion of “Seeing As”: The Tangled Landscape of Resemblance, 30 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 757, 759-60 (2000) (“[A]lthough these tests represent pragmatic attempts to deal 
with the puzzling and problematic nature of determining the existence and degree of resemblance, 
the tests remain—as is routinely noted by the very courts applying them—contingent, unwieldy, 
often incomplete, and, in many ways, generally unsatisfactory.”). 
 141 The stronger the mark the greater the protection.  See Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor 
Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2005); Nautilus Group, Inc. v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 
372 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 142 The more similar the marks, the more likely it is that a court will find infringement.  
Nautilus Group, 372 F.3d at 1344-45; Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972-73 
(10th Cir. 2002). 
 143 If the products are the same or similar, courts conclude that consumers are more likely to 
be confused.  See Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1056 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 458-59. 
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(5) the similarity of marketing methods and channels of 
distribution;145 
(6) the defendant’s good faith or intent in adopting the mark;146 
(7) the quality and cost of the products;147 
(8) the sophistication of the buyers and the degree of care they are 
likely to exercise in making the purchasing decision;148 and 
(9) actual confusion.149 
Over time every circuit has adopted some variation of these factors.150 
Even when courts consider the likelihood of confusion factors in 
an initial interest confusion case, they often discount several key 
 
 144 Bridging the gap describes the process of moving into the product or market area of the 
defendant.  This factor seeks to protect a senior user’s ability to enter a related market at some 
future time.  Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 459-60. 
 145 The more similar the marketing channels the more likely a finding of confusion. 
Playmakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2004); AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy 
Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 793 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 146 A plaintiff does not need to show intent to demonstrate trademark infringement, but courts 
consider intent in the likelihood of confusion factors because there is an assumption that if a 
defendant intended to confuse consumers he is more likely to have succeeded in doing so than 
someone who was not trying to confuse consumers.  See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
22 (1995). 
 147 If a good is of low quality and cheap, consumers are likely to expend less care in 
purchasing the good and therefore there is a greater chance of confusion.  In contrast, if a good is 
of high quality and expensive, then consumers are less likely to be confused by similar goods 
because they will take extra care in making their purchase.  Some courts also point to a disparity 
in quality between goods as decreasing the chance of confusion.  See, e.g., Savin Corp., 391 F.3d 
at 460-61. 
 148 By sophistication, courts refer to several components of a purchasing decision such as how 
educated the buyer is and how knowledgeable a buyer is about a particular product.  The more 
sophisticated a consumer, the less likely he or she is to be confused.  Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 
461; Maxim’s Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 149 Actual confusion is demonstrated by evidence that consumers have actually been confused 
by the use of the mark in commerce.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23 
(1995).  
 150 Many circuits use different numbers of factors and express the factors differently from one 
another.  See, e.g., Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1205 
(1st Cir. 1983) (8 factors); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961) (8 factors); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (10 factors); 
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (7 factors); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 
141 F.3d 188, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1998) (7 factors); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (8 factors); Rust Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1216 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (7 factors); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (8 
factors); Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2005) (6 factors); 
Alliance Metals, Inc. v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 907 (11th Cir. 2000) (7 factors); 
Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), 312 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2004) (7 factors); In 
re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (considering 13 factors in 
reviewing denial of federal registration (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 
1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (CCPA 1973))); see also Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, The 
Lanham Act: Time for a Face-Lift?, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1019 (2002) (describing the 
varying likelihood of confusion tests and the fact that even though many of the factors overlap the 
different phrasings often lead to different meanings). 
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factors, making it much more likely that a defendant will be found to 
have infringed a trademark or committed unfair competition.  For 
example, the vast majority of courts do not consider disclaimers to 
weigh against a finding of trademark infringement in initial interest 
confusion situations.151  In a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis, 
the use of a disclaimer that makes clear that a given product or service 
is not related to that of a trademark holder is sometimes considered 
sufficient to dispel any confusion.152  When disclaimers are not 
considered a potential remedy to confusion, the odds that a defendant 
will be found liable for infringement dramatically increase.  Dismissing 
the value of disclaimers in clearing up possible confusion eliminates the 
possible defense that any initial confusion was de minimis.  Even 
though disclaimers might not be seen at the time of initial interest or 
even initial confusion, they still protect consumers and serve to remedy 
any significant confusion. 
Many courts also do not consider the sophistication of purchasers 
or the care purchasers take in making a purchase when applying the 
initial interest confusion doctrine.153  These courts conclude that if 
consumers are initially confused then their subsequent sophistication in 
 
 151 See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003); Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, 233 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 2000); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 
(2d Cir. 2005); Shell Trademark Mgmt. BV v. Canadian Am. Oil Co., No. 02-01365, 2002 WL 
32104586, at *5, *7-9 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002); Caterpillar Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., No. 
CIV.A. 00-1111, 2002 WL 1301304, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002); Key3Media Events, Inc. v. 
Convention Connection, Inc., No. CV-S-001311, 2002 WL 385546, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 
2002); Simon Property Group, L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., No. IP 99-1195-C, 2001 WL 66408, at *22 
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2001); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000); PACCAR, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (E.D. Mich. 2000); New York State Soc’y of 
Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see 
also MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:6; cf. Horphag Research Ltd v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 
1042 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding infringement without mentioning defendant’s disclaimer, which 
appears at Excerpts of Record at 86). 
 152 See, e.g., Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (holding that disclaimer on refurbished golf balls was sufficient to dispel likelihood of 
confusion).  Courts often propose disclaimers as a remedy in traditional infringement actions. 
 153 See, e.g., PACCAR, 319 F.3d 243, 253-54; Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 
F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 
(2d Cir. 1987); WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other 
grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 
F. Supp. 2d at 341-42, 345; OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90; Bishops Bay Founders Group, Inc. v. 
Bishops Bay Apartments, L.L.C., 301 F. Supp. 2d 901, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2003); Grotrian, 
Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 229 U.S.P.Q. 890, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); 
Icon Solutions, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-4178, 1998 WL 314672 (E.D. 
Pa. June 15, 1998).  But see Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 
270, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2001) (both sophistication of purchasers and relatedness of products 
probative in initial interest confusion context); Rust Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 
F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering sophistication of purchasers in initial interest 
confusion analysis). 
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determining that two goods are not related is irrelevant.  The courts’ 
dismissal of the sophistication of purchasers in the initial interest 
context is illogical because sophisticated purchasers are less likely to be 
initially confused.  Consider the Grotrian case: Purchasers of pianos are 
generally considered highly sophisticated consumers of expensive 
products.154  Most consumers who seek out a high-end piano will 
probably start with a particular piano in mind, such as a Steinway.  Even 
though a consumer could initially be interested in a German-made 
“Steinweg” piano because it sounds similar to “Steinway,” such 
sophisticated purchasers are much less likely to be confused about the 
two brands being the same or having a business affiliation.  Thus, the 
sophistication of purchasers and the likely care exercised in purchasing 
an expensive good make confusion, even initial confusion, less likely.  
Moreover, even if there were some initial confusion, such confusion 
would be more likely to be quickly dispelled if sophisticated parties 
were involved. 
Another factor that lowers the bar for finding infringement is that 
courts often count initial interest confusion as evidence of actual 
confusion.  Traditionally, actual confusion requires a showing that 
consumers have actually been confused, but under the initial interest 
confusion doctrine, some courts have allowed evidence of actual 
interest rather than confusion to meet the standard.155  Evidence of 
actual confusion weighs heavily in favor of a finding of infringement,156 
so consideration of initial interest confusion in this factor greatly 
increases the likelihood of a finding of infringement. 
Thus, the initial interest confusion doctrine not only expands the 
circumstances under which defendants can be considered to have 
infringed a trademark, but by bypassing the traditional likelihood of 
confusion analysis, it also unreasonably increases the chances that a 
given defendant will be found to have infringed another’s trademark. 
 
 154 See Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1341-42. 
 155 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 
2004); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1998); Checkpoint Sys., 
269 F.3d at 297-98; see also Natural Answers, 233 F.3d 456, 465 (considering initial interest 
confusion as part of actual confusion analysis, but requiring there to be evidence of actual initial 
interest confusion not the mere risk of such initial confusion to support the factor). 
 156 See Savin, 391 F.3d at 459 (“There can be no more positive or substantial proof of the 
likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion.” (quoting World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick 
Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971))); Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. 
Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d 
at 812 (listing three most important factors in likelihood of confusion analysis as similarity of the 
marks, defendant’s intent, and evidence of actual confusion); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23 cmt. b (1995) (“[C]onvincing evidence of actual confusion is ordinarily 
decisive.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:13. 
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E.     Initial Interest Confusion Conflicts With Patent and 
Copyright Law 
 
The initial interest confusion doctrine is on a collision course with 
patent and copyright law because the doctrine can be used to restrict the 
copying of unpatented and uncopyrighted works.  This is especially true 
in the context of trade dress and design cases.  Patent and copyright law 
expressly allow a competitor to design a similar or even identical 
looking product, and such knock-offs often appeal to consumers 
precisely because they are initially interested in the trademark holder’s 
product or may even for a brief time think the products are the same.  
The Seventh Circuit in Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.157 explains 
the conflict between patent law and initial interest confusion: 
[The] notion that “[i]t is inherently unfair for a competitor to enter 
the market on the back of the originator of a design” . . . runs 
headlong into the patent laws, which grant limited monopolies for 
novel and nonobvious products.  As a necessary incident to the 
patent system, “[a]n unpatented article, like an article on which the 
patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and 
sold by whoever chooses to do so” . . . .  Thus, while trademark law 
forbids competitors from copying a product feature that serves as a 
source identifier, “effective competition and the penumbra of the 
patent laws require that competitors be able to slavishly copy the 
design of a successful product.”158 
Under established patent and copyright law, the mere inability of 
the public to distinguish two similar or even identical articles is not 
enough to prevent the selling of both goods.159  Nevertheless, the initial 
interest confusion doctrine allows for a finding of infringement when 
someone is initially interested in a copy because she likes the original 
and wants something similar.160  Patent and copyright law, however, not 
only determine “what is protected, but also what is free for all to 
use.”161  In copyright law, for example, ideas are not protectable.  Yet 
the initial interest confusion doctrine allows for the protection of ideas 
 
 157 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 158 Id. at 383 (rejecting argument that similar trade dress caused trademark infringement under 
initial interest confusion theory (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 
(1964))). 
 159 Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 384. 
 160 Cf. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (allowing trademark infringement 
finding based on similarity of trade dress of cars). 
 161 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); see also Sears, 
376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).  
Thomas Nachbar in his article Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 272 (2004), suggests that this limitation on trademark and other laws is not a constitutional 
but a statutory limitation.  I do not address that issue here because, in either case, current law 
precludes trademark law from protecting that which copyright and patent law expressly commit to 
the public domain. 
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when a person may be initially interested in a product or service 
because it is a similar concept to a trademark holder’s product.  
Moreover, the fact that courts reject the use of disclaimers in the initial 
interest confusion context prevents competitors from clarifying any 
confusion by clearly labeling their products. 
When state and federal laws conflict, federal law generally 
preempts state law.162  A more complex issue arises when two federal 
laws appear in conflict.  Courts must, if possible, interpret the two 
federal statutes so that they do not conflict.163  Accordingly, courts 
should read trademark law in harmony with copyright and patent law.  
There is nothing in the Lanham Act itself or in the legislative history 
that suggests that Congress intended the statute to trump pre-existing 
copyright and patent laws.  We should therefore assume that Congress 
legislated in accord with these other intellectual property frameworks.  
Reading the laws in harmony suggests that trademark law cannot limit 
mere initial interest or brief initial confusion caused by the similarity of 
uncopyrighted or unpatented works. 
To the extent that trademark law conflicts with copyright and 
patent law, copyright and patent principles should prevail because both 
patent and copyright protection are constitutionally mandated,164 
whereas trademark protection is authorized as an off-shoot of the 
Commerce Clause.165  Additionally, the protection of trademarks was 
intended to be a much more limited grant of rights than those afforded 
under patent and copyright law.166 
The issue of whether federal trademark laws are limited by patent 
and copyright law has arisen in two recent Supreme Court cases.  In 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,167 the plaintiff 
designed and patented temporary road signs with a mechanism built 
upon two springs to allow the signs to remain upright during severe 
 
 162 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 6-28 (3d ed. 2000); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of 
Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 207 (2002). 
    163  3 NORMAN SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §57.6 (6th ed. 2001). 
 164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 165 See Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 166 The House and Senate reports that preceded passage of the Lanham Act repeatedly contrast 
trademark protection with “monopolistic grants like patents and copyrights.”  S. REP. NO. 79-
1333, at 1275 (1946) (citing Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 
264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924), and United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918)); H.R. 
REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945) (same); H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 3 (1943) (same); H.R. REP. NO. 
77-2283, at 20 (1942) (same); H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3 (1939) (same); see also McLean v. 
Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (contrasting trademark protection with copyright and patent 
protection because there is no invention, creativity or skill involved in the trademarking of 
goods).  See also discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 167 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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weather conditions.  When the patents for the design expired, a 
competitor started making similar signs using a spring mechanism that 
looked identical and was in fact identical to that of the plaintiff’s signs.  
The plaintiff sued under the Lanham Act.168  The Supreme Court 
rejected the Lanham Act claim based on the use of identical trade dress.  
The Court’s holding relied on the functionality of the trade dress, a 
trademark concept, and left open the question of whether the holder of 
an expired utility patent could ever claim trade dress protection.169  
Dicta in TrafFix Devices suggests, however, that trademark law, even as 
set forth by the Lanham Act, must yield to copyright and patent laws.  
In its analysis, the TrafFix Devices Court cited to Bonito Boats v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.170 for the proposition that uncopyrighted or 
unpatented works can be copied regardless of trade dress protection: 
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many 
instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products.  
In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or 
copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.  As the 
Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or 
disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive economy.171 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dastar v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp.172 confirms this reading of TrafFix Devices, 
concluding that copyright laws limit the scope of the Lanham Act.  In 
Dastar, the defendants copied a work in the public domain, a video, 
without identifying the original author of the program.173  The plaintiff 
sued, saying that the lack of attribution violated the Lanham Act 
because consumers were likely to be deceived into thinking that the 
defendant had authored the work.  The Court rejected this argument 
explaining: 
[A]ccording special treatment to communicative products . . . causes 
the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which 
addresses that subject specifically.  The right to copy, and to copy 
without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like [the right to 
make an article whose patent has expired]—including the right to 
make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—passes to the 
public.174 
 
 168 Id. at 25-28.  There was also an issue of the products having similar names, WindMaster 
and Windbuster, on the basis of which the district court found trademark infringement.  This issue 
was not brought before the Supreme Court. 
 169 Id. at 28-35. 
 170 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 171 TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29 (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160). 
 172 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 173 Id. at 25-27.  The copyright on the work had expired and the work had thus fallen into the 
public domain.  Id. 
 174 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 
(1964)). 
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Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that in construing the 
Lanham Act, courts cannot “misuse or overexten[d]” trademark law 
“into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.”175  The 
Lanham Act cannot be used to create a “mutant copyright law,”176 
otherwise it could be used to create “a species of perpetual patent and 
copyright, which Congress may not do.”177 
If a work is free to be copied under patent or copyright law, 
trademark law cannot prevent such copying.  Trademark law must yield 
to patent and copyright law, even when confusion is possible.  
Trademark law can, however, require that competitors try to reduce the 
likelihood of consumer confusion.  The Supreme Court, for example, 
has suggested that disclaimers or labeling may be required to make clear 
who is the producer of a legitimately copied good.  In Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Supreme Court held that a state’s unfair 
competition laws could not prevent the duplication of the plaintiff’s 
Pole Lamp, even though the defendant’s design was virtually identical.  
The Court emphasized that a state could take steps to prevent consumer 
confusion by requiring labeling or distinctive packaging but it could not 
prevent the manufacturing and sale of identical goods even if the fact of 
their being identical caused some confusion.  As the Court explained: 
[The] mere inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart is 
not enough to support an injunction against copying or an award of 
damages for copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be 
copied.  Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require 
that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other 
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled 
as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their 
trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so 
as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading 
purchasers as to the source of the goods.178 
The same logic applies in the context of federal trademark law.  
Thus, states and the federal government can prevent passing off and 
misleading packaging and sales practices, but cannot enjoin the sale or 
advertising of a product merely because people will be interested in 
similar or even identical goods.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
suggested on multiple occasions that some amount of initial confusion 
must be tolerated to carry out the directives of patent and copyright law. 
 
 
 175 Id. at 33-34 (quoting TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29). 
 176 Id. at 34 . 
 177 Id. at 37 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003)). 
 178 Sears, 376 U.S. at 232. 
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F.     Initial Interest Confusion Violates the First Amendment 
 
The initial interest confusion doctrine also runs afoul of both the 
First Amendment and the speech-protective elements written into the 
Lanham Act by restricting non-misleading, truthful speech.  Congress, 
in drafting and amending the Lanham Act, emphasized its concern that 
the statute not violate the First Amendment and accordingly built into 
its framework several specific limitations to protect free speech.  The 
main speech-protective limit on the scope of trademark protection is the 
requirement of proving a likelihood of confusion in an infringement or 
unfair competition action.179  The Lanham Act also limits its expanse by 
distinguishing different types of marks and providing a sliding scale of 
protection depending on the uniqueness of the mark.  Arbitrary, fanciful 
and suggestive marks can be immediately protected, while descriptive 
marks must obtain secondary meaning before being granted trademark 
status.  Generic marks cannot be protected.180  Thus, Congress designed 
the Lanham Act to leave as many words, phrases and symbols in the 
public domain as possible and to require marks that had become 
synonymous with a type of product rather than the product itself to be 
given back to the public.  The Lanham Act also contains a statutory fair 
use defense that allows companies and individuals to accurately 
describe their own products, even if it requires using a mark that 
someone else owns.181  Using the initial interest confusion doctrine to 
find trademark infringement absent a showing of likely confusion 
directly violates the speech-protective elements built into the Lanham 
Act. 
The initial interest confusion doctrine also violates the First 
Amendment when used to restrict non-confusing references to 
trademarks.  Even though Congress included some speech-protective 
elements in drafting the Lanham Act, trademark law is still 
independently limited by the First Amendment.182  The Supreme 
Court’s recent holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft183 does not suggest 
otherwise.  In Eldred, the Court held that because First Amendment 
 
 179 Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, supra note 63, at 973. 
 180 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).  
 181 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000); see also discussion infra Part IV. 
 182 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(First Amendment applies to trademark claims when use of trademark is other than as a source 
identifier); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (First 
Amendment applies to uses of trademarks that are expressive in nature); Westchester Media v. 
PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2000) (must consider First Amendment 
when evaluating trademark claim and especially in designing remedy); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy 
Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (considering limits of First Amendment when evaluating 
trademark infringement claim); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating 
that First Amendment limits scope of trademark protection). 
 183 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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protections were written into the Copyright Act and the Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution, there could not be a separate First 
Amendment analysis of the constitutionality of the extension of the 
duration of copyright protection.184  In particular, the Court referred to 
the exclusion of ideas from copyright protection and the availability of 
the fair use defense.185  The Court also pointed to the specific “limited 
times” language used in the Copyright and Patent Clause and to the fact 
that the Clause was adopted around the same time as the First 
Amendment.186  In contrast, there is no specific grant of constitutional 
authority for trademark protection.  The speech-protective “limited 
times” language therefore does not apply to trademark law.  Unlike the 
Copyright Act, the Lanham Act does not leave ideas in the public 
domain and has a very narrow statutory fair use exception.  Trademarks 
also were never intended to provide the same broad-based property 
rights that copyrights and patents afford, but instead to grant a much 
more limited property right.187  Thus, a separate First Amendment 
analysis is still required when considering the enforcement of trademark 
law under the Lanham Act. 
Although not all speech involved in trademark infringement 
actions falls under the definition of commercial speech, much of it 
does.188  The precise contours of what distinguishes commercial from 
noncommercial speech are a subject of some controversy both on and 
off the Supreme Court,189 as is the question of whether commercial 
 
 184 Id. at 218-21. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 218-19. 
 187 See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 188 The Supreme Court has suggested that if the only purpose of speech is to propose a purely 
commercial transaction, it is commercial speech.  See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n 
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).  Generally speaking, advertisements for 
consumer products, such as shampoo, are considered commercial speech, while advertisements 
for movies, books and newspapers are not.  Once one moves away from the extreme examples, 
however, the distinction is difficult to pinpoint and has been widely criticized.  See infra note 
189. 
 189 The difference between commercial speech and noncommercial speech in Supreme Court 
doctrine has been repeatedly questioned both by members of the Court and scholars.  See 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574-75 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have 
observed previously that there is no ‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 
‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech.’  Indeed, I doubt whether 
it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-23 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part) (questioning justification for distinguishing between commercial and 
noncommercial speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493-97 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (questioning “artificiality” of a rigid commercial/non-commercial distinction); see 
also Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine, 36 RICH. L. REV. 91, 101 (2002) (“The distinction between ‘commercial’ and 
‘noncommercial’ speech has not been demarcated with any great precision, nor defined by the 
Court with any rigor.”); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (describing confused case law on commercial speech); Fred S. McChesney, 
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speech should receive less First Amendment protection than non-
commercial speech.190  Initial interest confusion, even under the lowest 
possible First Amendment scrutiny, is likely to be held unconstitutional 
when it is applied to prohibit the dissemination of truthful, non-
misleading speech.  When noncommercial speech is involved there is 
little question that application of the doctrine is unconstitutional.191 
Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment so long 
as it is not deceptive or misleading and concerns lawful activity.192  The 
Supreme Court has emphasized the value of commercial speech: “It is a 
matter of public interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well-informed.  To this end, the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensable.”193  “[C]ommerical speech bans not only 
hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central issues of 
public policy.”194  In fact, a “particular consumer’s interest in the free 
flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by 
far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”195 
 
De-Bates and Re-Bates: The Supreme Court’s Latest Commercial Speech Cases, 5 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 81, 119 (1997) (same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes and Free 
Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 126 (1996) (“After 
Liquormart, it is unclear why ‘commercial speech’ should continue to be treated as a separate 
category of speech isolated from general First Amendment principles.”); Alex Kozinski & Stuart 
Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 652-53 (1990) (questioning 
the legitimacy of any distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech) [hereinafter 
Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech]. 
 190 See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 574-77 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that content-
discriminatory commercial speech restrictions should be analyzed under strict scrutiny); Greater 
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(restrictions on commercial speech justified by denying information to the public are per se 
unconstitutional); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S at 501, 510-14, 517-18 (plurality opinion of Stevens, 
J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.) (suggesting that no restriction on truthful commercial 
advertising is justifiable); id. at 518-20 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (contending that strict 
scrutiny should apply when government seeks to restrict truthful commercial speech); Rubin, 514 
U.S. at 493-97 (Stevens, J., concurring) (urging application of higher standard of review to 
restrictions on non-misleading commercial speech); Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of 
Commercial Speech, supra note 189, at 648-53. 
 191 In the context of noncommercial speech, the application of the initial interest confusion 
doctrine should be treated as a content-based restriction analyzed under strict scrutiny.  In such 
instances, the application of the doctrine absent a showing of more than de minimis likely 
confusion should be held unconstitutional.  I also note that when noncommercial speech is 
involved courts might also reject the infringement claim on the alternative grounds that the 
allegedly infringing use of a trademark does not qualify as a “trademark use.” 
 192 Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366 (2002) (citing Virginia Bd. Of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)); Edenfield v. Fane, 
507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New 
York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 193 Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 495-96 
(describing historical value of commercial speech); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-
History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993). 
 194 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503. 
 195 Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. 
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Although Supreme Court precedents suggest that commercial 
speech deserves less protection than noncommercial speech, the Court 
in recent years has provided increasing protection for commercial 
speech, and several members of the Court have suggested that strict 
scrutiny should apply when restrictions limit truthful, non-misleading 
commercial speech.196  The current test for determining whether a 
restriction on commercial speech is legitimate is the Central Hudson 
test.  Under Central Hudson, 
[i]f the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, [courts 
must] ask “whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.”  
If it is, then [courts] “determine whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted,” and, finally, “whether 
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”  
Each of these . . . inquiries must be answered in the affirmative for 
the regulation to be found constitutional.197  
When evaluating the final step of the Central Hudson test, whether 
the restriction is more extensive than necessary, courts must “carefully 
calculate the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech 
imposed by the regulations.”198  Courts must consider the “degree to 
which speech is suppressed—or what alternative avenues for speech 
remain available.”199 
The Central Hudson test has come under fire in recent years from 
members of the Court and scholars alike.200  Some have speculated that 
 
 196 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574-77 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that content-discriminatory commercial speech restrictions should be 
analyzed under strict scrutiny); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 
173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (restrictions on commercial speech justified by denying 
information to the public are per se unconstitutional); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501, 510-14, 
517-18 (1996) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.) (suggesting 
that no restriction on truthful commercial advertising is justifiable); id. at 518-20 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part) (contending that strict scrutiny should apply when government seeks to 
restrict truthful commercial speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493-97 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (higher standard of review should apply to non-misleading commercial 
speech); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts 
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 699-702 (2003) (describing 
increased scrutiny that restrictions on commercial speech have received since the early 1990s). 
 197 Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S at 566).  Application of 
trademark protections and the initial interest confusion doctrine are generally viewed as being 
content-based restrictions on speech because infringement decisions turn on the content of the 
speech.  See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2004); Volokh, supra note 196.  Even if such restrictions are considered content-neutral, the 
Supreme Court has treated the analysis under the O’Brien time, place, and manner test as the 
same as that under the Central Hudson test.  See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United 
States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987).  I therefore apply the Central Hudson test 
for simplicity. 
 198 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (citations and quotations omitted); Greater New Orleans, 527 
U.S. at 188. 
 199 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 563. 
 200 See Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (observing that “several members of the Court have 
expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis”); id. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
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the Court, when given an appropriate case, may replace the Central 
Hudson test.  It is even possible that the Court will go further and 
provide full First Amendment protection to commercial speech.  The 
usefulness of applying the Central Hudson test is therefore somewhat 
limited—this is especially true given the inconsistency of the cases 
decided under the test.201  Nevertheless, several principles can be 
garnered from the nearly thirty years of cases decided by the Supreme 
Court since it held that commercial speech was protected by the First 
Amendment.  When truthful, non-deceptive speech is at issue, the Court 
has generally struck down restrictions on commercial speech.202  In 
striking down a ban on advertisements for alcohol that included pricing 
information, the Court explained: “Precisely because bans against 
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect 
consumers from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest 
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond 
‘irrationally’ to the truth.”203 
The Court’s 2002 decision in Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center204 highlights that when the government can achieve its interests 
 
(rejecting Central Hudson test at least where truthful, non-misleading speech is at issue); 
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (recognizing that several members of court have questioned Central 
Hudson but observing that is not necessary to break new ground in case); id. at 571-72 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (questioning validity of Central Hudson because it is 
underprotective of truthful commercial speech); id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring) (contending 
that strict scrutiny should apply to advertising restrictions on truthful speech); Greater New 
Orleans, 527 U.S. at 184 (recognizing that “certain judges, scholars and amici curiae have 
advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more 
straightforward and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on 
commercial speech”); id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (Central Hudson should not apply when 
government’s goal is to keep public “ignorant”); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (questioning logic of Central Hudson); id. at 518-19 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) 
(criticizing application of Central Hudson when government’s justification is based on keeping 
public “ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace”); Rubin, 514 U.S. at 
493-97 (Stevens, J., concurring) (questioning application of Central Hudson standard to non-
misleading commercial speech). 
 201 See generally Volokh, supra note 196; Rotunda, supra note 189; Post, supra note 189; 
McChesney, supra note 189; Sullivan, supra note 189; Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of 
Commercial Speech, supra note 189. 
 202 See, e.g., Western States, 535 U.S. at 376-77 (striking down ban on advertisements for 
compounded drugs); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 570 (striking down restrictions on tobacco 
advertisements); Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. 195-96 (striking down restrictions on 
advertisements for gambling in states where gambling is legal); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484, 489 
(striking down ban on advertisements that “provide the public with accurate information about 
retail prices of alcoholic beverages”); Rubin, 514 U.S. 476, 491 (striking down prohibition on 
placing alcohol content on beer labels); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771-72 (1993) (striking 
down ban on truthful, non-deceptive information provided by CPAs to potential clients); Peel v. 
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) (striking down 
advertising ban that prevented attorneys from accurately promoting their certifications in 
specialized fields). 
 203 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503. 
 204 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
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without restricting speech or by restricting less speech, it must do so.  
“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating 
speech must be a last—not first—resort.”205  The Court in Western 
States held that the federal government could not prohibit the 
advertising and promotion of compounded drugs despite accepting as 
substantial the government’s interest in protecting consumers.  The 
Court held that there were other ways to protect consumers from 
untested compounded drugs besides denying them truthful information, 
such as requiring labeling on compounded drugs to warn consumers that 
the drugs had not undergone FDA testing.206  The Court emphasized 
that the government cannot suppress truthful information simply out of 
“fear that people would make bad decisions.”207 
The Western States majority cited and quoted extensively from the 
analysis in Virginia Board of Pharmacy.208 In Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court rejected a ban on advertising information 
and prices for prescription drugs, explaining: 
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic 
approach [of banning truthful advertising].  That alternative is to 
assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will 
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels 
of communication rather than to close them. . . .  [T]he choice among 
these alternative approaches is not ours to make [or the legislature’s].  
It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing 
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, 
that the First Amendment makes for us.209 
The Court made clear that the State of Virginia could regulate 
pharmacists but could not do it by “keeping the public in ignorance of 
the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacies are offering.”210  It 
is more speech, rather than “enforced silence,” that the First 
Amendment demands as a solution for most government concerns.211  
“Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of 
the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate 
 
 205 Id. at 373. 
 206 Id. at 373-75. 
 207 Id. at 374. 
 208 Id. at 374-75. 
 209 Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“The First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the 
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”); Peel v. Attorney Registration 
and Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990) (rejecting paternalistic assumptions 
that recipients of mailing were “no more discriminating than the audience for children’s 
television”). 
 210 Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
 211 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498. 
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information is better than no information.”212  The Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of providing consumers information to 
assist in making purchasing decisions.213 
In the initial interest confusion context it is even clearer that 
truthful commercial speech should not be restricted.  Unlike the 
circumstances in Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Western States, the 
motivation behind shutting down truthful speech about trademarked 
products and services is not paternalistic.  The fear is not that consumers 
will act irrationally, but instead a fear that consumers will react 
rationally and choose a competitor’s product over that of a trademark 
holder.  Thus, even more so than in the paternalistic consumer 
protection cases, the Supreme Court is likely to be skeptical of the 
government’s justifications for denying consumers truthful, non-
misleading information simply to shore up the strength of individual 
trademarks. 
Only a handful of Supreme Court cases that are still good law 
uphold restrictions on truthful and non-deceptive speech involving a 
legal activity.214  The primary circumstances in which the Supreme 
Court has upheld restrictions on truthful commercial speech are those in 
which the speech is viewed as unduly coercive, invading consumers’ 
privacy rights, or involving the regulation of a profession, especially 
attorneys.  In Orhalik v. Ohio State Bar Association,215 for example, the 
Court upheld limits on the in-person solicitation of an accident victim 
by an attorney within two weeks of the accident while the injured party 
was in the hospital.216  Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Went For It,217 the 
Supreme Court held that the Florida Bar could stop lawyers from 
soliciting clients by direct mail within thirty days of a personal injury or 
wrongful death.218  The Court emphasized the serious privacy concerns 
involved in contacting likely distraught and vulnerable victims so close 
to the time of an accident.219  The Court also highlighted the importance 
of maintaining a positive professional image of attorneys.220  None of 
these unique factors apply in the initial interest confusion setting.221 
 
 212 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562 
(1980) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977)). 
 213 See id. at 567. 
 214 I do not address Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) 
(limiting advertising of gambling in jurisdiction in which gambling was lawful), because it has 
been overruled.  See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508-09; id. at 531-32 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 215 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
 216 Id. at 449-53, 460-68. 
 217 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
 218 Id. at 620. 
 219 Id. at 630-32. 
 220 Id.  The Court also emphasized that lawyers had ample other avenues of advertising 
available, including television and radio advertisements, yellow pages and even direct mailing 
after the thirty-day period had elapsed. 
 221 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1993) (Ohralik’s holding was “narrow” and 
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Perhaps the case most relevant for considering how the Supreme 
Court might analyze the application of the initial interest confusion 
doctrine absent a showing of likely confusion is its 1987 decision in San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee 
[hereinafter “SFAA”].222  SFAA involved a lawsuit brought by the 
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to prevent the SFAA from 
holding an athletic competition called the “Gay Olympic Games.”  
Although the decision did not involve an action for trademark 
infringement, its treatment of a similar provision in the Amateur Sports 
Act provides some insight into how the Court might evaluate a 
challenge to the initial interest confusion doctrine.  The Amateur Sports 
Act of 1978 authorizes the USOC to prohibit certain commercial and 
promotional uses of certain words, including “Olympic.”223  The statute, 
unlike the Lanham Act, does not require a demonstration of likely 
confusion.224  The SFAA challenged the constitutionality of the statute 
because it did not require such a showing of likely confusion.  The 
Court applied the Central Hudson/O’Brien test to determine whether the 
prohibition on the use of the word “Olympic” violated the First 
Amendment.225  The Court concluded that the restriction was 
constitutional because Congress had a strong public interest in 
promoting amateur athletics and in reaping all of the financial rewards 
the USOC had accumulated in the word “Olympic.”226 
While at first glance this case may suggest that it is constitutional 
to allow a finding of trademark infringement absent a showing of likely 
confusion, several crucial factors suggest otherwise.  First, the Court 
emphasized that there was possible confusion by the SFAA’s use of the 
word “Olympic” and pointed out that by passing the statute Congress 
may have “reasonably . . . conclude[d] that most commercial uses of the 
Olympic words and symbols are likely to be confusing.”227  The Court 
described the “possibility for confusion as to sponsorship . . . obvious” 
 
“unique”); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 475, 485-86 (1988) (stating that undue 
influence is unlikely outside Ohralik situation); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641-42 (1985) (suggesting that Ohralik does not apply 
outside in-person solicitation circumstances); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202-03 (1982) 
(explaining that limits on commercial speech only valid if speech is deceptive or subject to 
abuse); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 112 (1990) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court has only upheld bans on non-deceptive 
advertising when the information is provided in circumstances which are “inherently conducive to 
deception and coercion”). 
 222 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 223 Id. at 525-26; see also 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2000) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 380) (as expanded 
by the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1998). 
 224 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 530. 
 225 The Court noted that the two tests are substantially similar.  See id. at 536-37 & 537 n.16. 
 226 Id. at 531-41. 
 227 Id. at 539. 
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given the title  “Gay Olympic Games.”228  Thus, the case arguably did 
involve a misleading or confusing use of a mark. 
Second, the trademark holder in SFAA was an agency affiliated 
with the United States government.  In contrast, in the initial interest 
confusion context most trademark holders are private businesses, who 
will likely be afforded lesser protection and whose interests will no 
doubt be considered less substantial. 
Third, the Supreme Court emphasized that the SFAA could easily 
substitute the term “games” for “Olympics” without changing the 
meaning.  While this conclusion is suspect and has drawn wide and 
deserving criticism,229 its logic does not apply when a competitor 
simply makes reference to the trademarked product itself.  The Court 
may well have reached a different conclusion had the USOC sought to 
prevent the “Gay Games” from advertising that it was an alternative to 
the “Olympics” for gay athletes. Finally, the opinion in SFAA predates 
the more stringent analysis that recent commercial speech restrictions 
have received. 
Although it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will 
apply its constantly shifting commercial speech doctrine, the Court is 
unlikely to be persuaded that restricting non-misleading references to 
another’s trademark constitutes a substantial government interest.  In 
such instances, speech restrictions do not protect consumers, but instead 
deny them useful information and make it more difficult for consumers 
to compare products and even for them to choose between products.  
Instead, the main justification for the doctrine is to maximize the profits 
of trademark holders at the expense of individual consumers and other 
competitors in the marketplace.  Even the Supreme Court, with its 
generally deferential attitude to government interests, is unlikely to be 
satisfied by such a justification.  Moreover, the restriction on references 
to others’ trademarks will likely be viewed as “more extensive than is 
necessary” because ample means are not left open to communicate 
one’s message. 
Application of the initial interest confusion doctrine has already 
and will continue to chill speech because of the threat of litigation and 
the risk of successful lawsuits.  Trademark holders will be able to bully 
competitors and critics into silence, thereby leaving the public with 
fewer choices, less information about products, and more expensive 
goods.  The doctrine also risks severely limiting the public’s ability to 
express ideas and to communicate.  The initial interest confusion 
doctrine has been used to give Playboy Enterprises a monopoly over the 
 
 228 Id. 
 229 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 196, at 736-39; ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 136-38 (1998); Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial 
Speech, supra note 189, at 649-50; Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 412-21. 
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words “playboy,” “playgirl” and “playmate.”230  Ralph Lauren now has 
claim to the word “polo” and has limited the publication of a magazine 
called “Polo.”231  The doctrine has given Upjohn the right to prevent 
others from using the prefix “pro” for products containing the chemical 
compound progesterone.232  Consumers and competitors should be able 
to use trademarked words to refer not only to such generic terms, but 
also to the trademarked products or services themselves so long as the 
uses are not confusing.  There is no legitimate justification to prevent a 
person, including a competitor, from referring to Tylenol, Prozac or 
Kleenex, even though he or she could say acetaminophen, anti-
depressant or tissue instead.  Trademarks often serve as important short-
hand to describe a genre of a product.  This is true even when a 
trademark has not become “generic” in the trademark sense.233  For 
example, it is very difficult to describe an item similar to “iTunes” in an 
efficient way without using the trademarked term.  It is inefficient to use 
more words than necessary to describe goods, and it depletes the 
richness of our culture and language to be denied the use of certain 
words simply because they are trademarked.234 
 
III.     MOTIVATION TO ADOPT AND EXPAND INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION 
 
Although the initial interest confusion doctrine has created many 
troubling results and potential problems, there are some legitimate 
motivations behind its origin and development.  Before considering 
alternative approaches, it is important to understand the problems that 
courts have sought to resolve by creating and applying initial interest 
confusion.  Some of the concerns raised by members of the judiciary are 
justifiable and deserving of solutions; other concerns reflect the 
mistaken views that any competition is wrong and that trademark 
protections provide broad-based property rights. 
 
 230 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2004).  
But see Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing former Playboy 
Playmate of the Month to put term “playmate” in metatags for her website). 
 231 See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 660-61 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 232 See Upjohn Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 1:95CV237, 1996 WL 33322175, at *8 
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 1996). 
 233 Words become generic when the word stands for the type of good rather than the particular 
good manufactured by a particular vendor.  Determining whether a mark has become generic, 
however, is not clear-cut.  Decisions of when something has become generic are very 
unpredictable.  Words often are considered common words by Webster’s dictionary but still 
treated as distinctive by the courts.  See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 12.19; LANDES & 
POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 196. 
 234 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 69, at 268-69 (describing one of main 
purposes of trademarks as linguistic efficiency); COOMBE, supra note 229, at 60 (describing 
cultural and linguistic value of trademarked words, as well as use of trademarks to protect 
efficient communication of information). 
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A.     Legitimate Concerns 
1.     Pre-Sale Confusion and 1962 Lanham Act Amendments 
 
The seeds of initial interest confusion were first sown in 1962 
when Congress amended the Lanham Act to eliminate the requirement 
that “purchasers” be deceived.  Prior to 1962, the Lanham Act allowed 
for a finding of infringement only when the use of a mark was “likely to 
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of 
origin of such goods or services.”235 
In 1962, the reference to “purchasers” was eliminated.  Trademark 
infringement therefore could be found under Section 32 if the use of a 
mark was simply “likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.”236  
In specific reference to the deletion of the words “purchasers as to the 
source of origin of such goods or services,” the Senate Report explains 
that: 
The purpose of the proposed change is to coordinate the language 
here with that used elsewhere and to omit the word “purchasers,” 
since the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as well as 
to actual purchasers.  The word “purchasers” is eliminated so as to 
avoid the possibility of misconstruction of the present language of 
the statute.237 
Courts properly interpreted the change in the Lanham Act as 
broadening the concept of trademark infringement to include 
consideration not only of confusion at the time of sale, but also of 
confusion that exists prior to the time of sale, and that which emerges 
after a sale is completed.238  Many courts properly limit consideration of 
the likelihood of confusion to actual or potential purchasers of the 
goods or services in question.239  In other words, they do not concern 
 
 235 Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, at 437-38 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (2000)) (emphasis added). 
 236 Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962); see also S. 2429, 86th Cong. (1959).  The 
language referring to “origin” also was eliminated and provides the basis for the subsequent 
expansion of confusion to include confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship. 
 237 S. REP. NO. 87-2107, at 2847, 2850-51 (1962) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 87-1108, 
at 4  (1961) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 86-1685, at 5 (1960). 
 238 “Post-sale confusion refers not to the resale of the original product . . . but to the risk that 
non-purchasers, who themselves may be future customers, will be deceived.”  I.P. Lund Trading 
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 
94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 
867, 872 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that 1962 amendments allow for likelihood of confusion finding 
based on post-sale confusion); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 
(2d Cir. 1971). 
 239 See, e.g., Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 
396 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., 
Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, 
L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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themselves with whether a person who would never consider buying a 
piano might be confused between a “Steinway” and a “Grotrian-
Steinweg” piano.  Other courts, however, have read the amended 
provision much more broadly to include any person likely to be 
confused.240 
There can be little question that the 1962 amendments gave 
statutory authority for courts to consider consumer confusion that 
occurs outside the time of sale, including confusion prior to the time of 
sale.  But the statute did not retreat from the requirement that a plaintiff 
must demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. 
 
2.     Baiting and Switching 
 
Another justification courts provide for the adoption of initial 
interest confusion is preventing the practice of baiting and switching.  
Baiting and switching involves initially passing off one’s goods as those 
of another, even if a consumer ultimately discovers prior to the time of 
purchase that the products or services are unrelated.  One aspect of 
baiting and switching involves “luring” an unwary consumer by 
creating initial confusion.  It is from this concept that the initial interest 
confusion doctrine grew. 241 
Baiting and switching is a legitimate concern.  If consumers are 
misled into believing that a product is made by one company when in 
truth it is not and as a result expend significant time and effort to 
purchase the deceptive product, then it matters little that the confusion 
 
 240 See, e.g., Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(considering likelihood of confusion among consumers regardless of whether they are potential 
purchasers); Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(considering confusion among general public).  Without explaining his reasoning, J. T. McCarthy 
concludes that the 1962 amendments allow a finding of infringement without a showing of 
likelihood of confusion and regardless of whether potential purchasers are considered.  
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 5:6. 
 241 Many courts have compared initial interest confusion to baiting and switching practices.  
See, e.g., AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 828 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Such 
‘bait and switch,’ also known as ‘initial interest’ confusion, will affect the buying decisions of the 
consumers when it permits the competitor to ‘get its foot in the door’ by confusing the 
consumers.”); Checkpoint Systems, 269 F.3d at 293-95 (comparing initial interest confusion to 
“bait[ing] and switch[ing]” and the “luring” of consumers); Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 382 (same); 
Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); 
Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119 (D. Minn. 2000) (“This ‘initial 
interest confusion’ has been described as a ‘bait’ and ‘switch.’”); MCCARTHY, supra note 12,  § 
23:6; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“[Initial interest] confusion, which is actionable under the Lanham Act, occurs when a consumer 
is lured to a product by its similarity to a known mark, even though the consumer realizes the true 
identity and origin of the product before consummating a purchase.”); Rust Env’t & 
Infrastructure, Inc., v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1997) (comparing “initial interest 
confusion” to the “luring” of potential customers). 
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is ultimately cleared up prior to the time of purchase.  For example, 
suppose that a Grotrian-Steinweg dealer places an advertisement that 
announces a “Huge Sale on the Original Steinways!” hoping to get 
customers in the door who think the store is selling real Steinways.  A 
person who is misled by the advertisement into thinking she’s going to 
get a real “Steinway” for half the price may well drive to a store far 
away from her home.  By the time she gets to the store and realizes that 
the Steinweg is not really a Steinway, she might decide that the 
Steinweg is good enough and buy it anyway.  Even if she doesn’t, the 
deception may have cost her the better part of an afternoon, gas, wear 
and tear on her car, and a not insignificant bit of road rage.  Courts 
correctly treat such pre-sale confusion as unfair competition and 
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.  The dealer’s deceptive 
act limits a consumer’s choices—instead of being provided more 
information, a potential purchaser is fed misinformation.  The 
competing company in this situation uses trickery and deception to 
succeed, rather than making a better or cheaper product than its 
competitor.  Grotrian-Steinweg should be free to suggest that it has a 
historical link to Steinway, if that is true, and to suggest that its pianos 
are as good as and cheaper than Steinway’s, but it cannot mislead 
consumers into thinking that its pianos are Steinways. 
The 1962 amendment to the Lanham Act appropriately and 
adequately addresses such baiting and switching practices.  Therefore, 
there is no need and no authority for courts to create the expansive 
initial interest confusion doctrine that applies to situations in which 
confusion is unlikely. 
 
B.     Misguided Justifications for Initial Interest Confusion 
1.     Trading Off Another’s Goodwill  
 
One of the driving forces behind the adoption and proliferation of 
the initial interest confusion doctrine is a gut reaction by some judges 
and scholars that defendants are “free-riding” off value built up in a 
product or service by a trademark holder.  Some courts have expanded 
the initial interest confusion doctrine under the misguided notion that a 
competitor should never profit from another’s success and that any 
decline in the profits of a trademark holder should be remedied.  Yet 
this initial, visceral reaction flies in the face of basic free market 
principles which allow, and in fact demand, that competitors be able to 
benefit from value created by others.   
While it is true that the Supreme Court has referred to an unjust 
enrichment principle that one should not “reap where [one] has not 
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sown,”242 this theory (which allows recovery under tort law) has been 
applied only in a very limited and exceptional set of circumstances that 
do not apply to initial interest confusion.243  The Supreme Court has 
applied this “labor-reward” analysis only when the entire value of a 
work is destroyed by the actions of a defendant; for example, in the 
International News Service case, a competing news agency stole news 
stories and published them before the original service could publish 
them, thus destroying the entire value of the original work.244  Similarly, 
in the Zacchini case, a performance artist’s entire performance (being 
shot out of a cannonball) was shown on the evening news, thus 
destroying much of the economic value of his performance because 
nothing was left for a paying audience to see.245  Similar circumstances 
do not arise in the initial interest confusion context.  The entire value of 
a trademark holder’s product or service is not destroyed simply because 
a competitor refers to the trademark holder’s product or service. 
Fair competition is not the same as no competition.  Competitors 
are always harmed when competing goods succeed.  The fact that a 
trademark holder’s profits may be reduced if a competitor is permitted 
to refer to or model its product after a trademark holder’s product is 
irrelevant.  As William Landes and Richard Posner explain, “[a] 
fundamental principle of American law is that competition is not a tort, 
that is, an invasion of a legally protected right.  Freedom to imitate, to 
copy is a cornerstone of competition and operates to minimize 
monopoly profits.”246 
In the trademark context, the unjust enrichment rationale is limited 
by such traditional notions of fair competition.  Even though it is true 
that the Lanham Act was passed at least in part to protect the goodwill 
of businesses, it was meant to do so only in circumstances in which 
others profited from a company’s goodwill by deceiving consumers.  If 
consumers are never confused, trademark infringement should not be an 
available remedy—trademark infringement turns on consumer 
confusion, not the business losses of a trademark holder.  Moreover, 
there is a big difference between harming a company’s goodwill and 
 
 242 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). 
 243 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Int’l News Serv., 
248 U.S. 215; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmts. b & c (1995) 
(describing Int’l News Serv. and its unjust enrichment rationale as being very limited doctrine 
only applied in rare circumstances when primary market for product is destroyed by competitive 
use). 
 244 Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 243-44. 
 245 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77 (allowing a right of publicity case under Ohio law to go 
forward).  But see id. at 579 n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 246 LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 23; see also FTC v. Brown 
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS ch. VIII. (1776); 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS  § 708 (1938) (causing business losses is not an unfair trade practice). 
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benefiting from that goodwill.  Trademark law meant to prevent the 
former but not the latter. 
Trademark protection is also limited by laws which expressly 
allow the public to use copyrighted and patented works once those 
patents and copyrights expire.  Both patent and copyright law allow for 
the copying of an author’s or an inventor’s work once it enters the 
public domain or if the work was not deserving of patent or copyright 
protection in the first place.247  Thus, the simple fact that someone was 
the first to create or build a following for a product is not a basis to 
afford intellectual property rights.  In holding that Kellogg’s could make 
and sell “Shredded Wheat,” even though it had not invented the cereal, 
the Supreme Court explained: 
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the 
article known as “Shredded Wheat”; and thus is sharing in a market 
which was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff’s 
predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in 
advertising persistently made.  But that is not unfair.  Sharing in the 
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the 
exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the free exercise of 
which the consuming public is deeply interested.248 
The Court allows Kellogg’s “free-riding” so long as there is no 
deception of consumers or passing off of the Kellogg’s product as that 
of Nabisco’s.  While the court refers to works not protected by “trade-
mark,” it is clear both from this case and subsequent case law that the 
reference to trade-mark protection was circumscribed to circumstances 
in which the use of another’s trademark was confusing and particularly 
to the situation in which a defendant was passing off its goods as those 
of another. 
The protection of trademarks was never intended to shut down all 
competition.  Trademark law requires a balancing not just of consumer 
confusion and protection of a trademark holder’s goodwill, but also 
consideration of the legitimate interests of competing businesses.249  It 
has long been understood “to be in the interest of the public that any 
competitor should be free to divert [customers] to himself by all fair and 
reasonable means . . . .  In short, it is no tort to beat a business rival to 
prospective customers.”250  The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition similarly have recognized that fair competition 
allows for the distraction of consumers by direct competitors: 
 
 247 See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 248 Kellogg Co v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). 
 249 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 250 A-Mark Coin Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 195 Cal. Rptr. 859, 866-67 (1983) (emphasis 
added) (describing state tort law); see also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 207, 215 
(3d Cir. 1995) (citing Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 121, and Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 
40 F.3d 1431, 1445 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
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The freedom to compete necessarily contemplates the probability of 
harm to the commercial relations of other participants in the 
market[.]  The freedom to compete implies a right to induce 
prospective customers to do business with the actor rather than with 
the actor’s competitors.  [A seller is permitted] to seek to divert 
business not only from competitors generally, but also from a 
particular competitor.251 
Such diversions and distractions are fair game so long as consumers are 
not deceived as to the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of a product or 
service. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a person can refer to 
another’s trademark so long as consumers are not confused.252  In 
Champion Spark Plugs v. Sanders,253 for example, the Court held that a 
defendant could sell reconditioned and repaired Champion spark plugs 
and mark them as Champion plugs so long as consumers were informed 
that the plugs were reconditioned and not distributed by Champion.254  
The Court explained that a trademark is an identifier rather than a 
property right.  Therefore, the use of a competitor’s mark that does not 
cause confusion as to source is permissible.255  “When the mark is used 
 
 251 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) (emphasis added).  
The Restatement of Unfair Competition rejects an earlier position taken in the Restatement of 
Torts that suggested an exception from the doctrine of freedom to compete when competition was 
motivated by ill will.  The new Restatement confirms that ill will is not a basis for a finding of 
unfair competition on its own.  See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. 
REV. 1289, 1304 (1940). 
 252 See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428-29 (2003); Steele v. 
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 
125, 127, 131 (1947) (holding that company could recondition and sell Champion spark plugs so 
long as it indicated that plugs were reconditioned Champion spark plugs, not sponsored by 
Champion); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 367-69 (1924) (holding that unaffiliated 
company could resell smaller sized bottles of trademark holder’s perfume so long as no one was 
misled); Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1910) (holding that competitor would not 
commit infringement by selling same product as another company if clearly labeled); Lawrence 
Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1891); Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 
54-56 (1879) (holding that one cannot prevent others from using a mark unless the use misleads 
consumers regarding the origin of the product); see also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th 
Cir. 1968) (holding that a company that made perfume that smelled like Chanel No. 5 could 
compare its product to the trademarked perfume).  Notably, most of these cases preceded the 
statutory expansion of trademark protection to include indications of affiliation and sponsorship 
as well as of origin.  Nevertheless, the conclusions are equally applicable to cases involving 
issues of sponsorship or affiliation, so long as consumers are not misled as to such sponsorship or 
affiliation.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 (1995). 
 253 331 U.S. 125 (1947). 
 254 Id. at 126-27, 130-32. 
 255 Id. at 129; see also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380-81 (7th Cir. 
1996) (citing Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995), and August 
Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995)); New Kids on the Block v. News 
Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he fact that [a plaintiff’s trademark is 
used to promote] profit and in competition with the trademark holder’s business is beside the 
point.”). 
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in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the 
word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.  It is not taboo.”256 
The current trend in district courts and courts of appeal towards 
protecting a business’s goodwill through the expansion of the initial 
interest confusion doctrine represents a shift in the theoretical 
framework of trademark law—from protecting marks only in a limited 
set of circumstances, in which consumers are likely to be confused, to a 
broader protection more similar to that afforded patent and copyright 
holders.  Preventing any reference to another’s trademark essentially 
conveys a monopoly right to the trademark holder.257  There are a 
number of reasons why trademark law should not be read to provide 
such a broad property right to trademark holders. 
First, Congress, in adopting federal trademark protection, expressly 
distinguished trademarks from copyrights and patents and made clear 
that trademark protection would be much more limited in scope, and 
would not afford monopoly rights or property rights in gross.258  The 
distinction is important because in contrast to copyrights and patents, 
the registration and protection of trademarks does not require any 
demonstration of creativity, originality, or novelty.  Therefore, there are 
fewer restrictions on what can be trademarked, and it is more likely that 
more common words, phrases, symbols, and even colors will be 
trademarked and taken out of the public domain.  Moreover, patent and 
copyright protection exist only for limited times, whereas trademark 
protection can be extended indefinitely.259  Thus, the harm to the public 
from expanding the scope of trademark protection is substantial. 
Second, the creation of trademarks does not involve the same 
degree of labor and effort as producing patented and copyrighted works.  
Most trademark holders expend more time and energy in advertising 
and marketing their products and promoting their trademarks than in 
creating the trademark itself.  Thus, there is no need to expand the 
rewards for the creation of such marks.  Additionally, unlike 
copyrighted and patented works, there is no need to further incentivize 
the creation of trademarks by expanding the protection afforded to 
 
 256 Champion Spark Plugs, 331 U.S. at 129 (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 
368 (1924) (Holmes, J.)). 
 257 FTC v. Motion Picture Ad. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); Trainer, 101 U.S. at 54. 
 258 See supra note 166.  While it is true that some protection of trademark rights under the 
British Empire and during Roman times conveyed monopoly rights for specific products on 
certain favored producers, those monopoly trademark rights were not imported into United States 
trademark law.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. b (1995). 
 259 A trademark remains protected if it continues to be in use and to identify a particular 
product.  Under current trademark law, a trademark owner must file an affidavit of use during the 
sixth year after registration and then in every tenth year stating that the trademark is still in use.  
The trademark owner must also file a renewal application.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2000). 
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them; companies receive sufficient incentives from the market itself to 
generate and promote strong marks.260 
Finally, in contrast to patent and copyright law, the public plays a 
unique participatory role in creating the value and even the 
protectability of trademarks.261  Much of the power and strength of 
trademarks are created by consumers.  Corporations rely on consumers 
to create the value in their trademarks.  The establishment of trademark 
law itself is premised on public participation in the creation of 
meaning.262  When evaluating eligibility for trademark protection, 
courts, juries and the Patent and Trademark Office look to consumers to 
evaluate whether a descriptive trademark has gained secondary 
meaning.  A descriptive mark generally achieves secondary meaning 
only if an appreciable number of consumers recognize the mark and 
associate it with a particular product.263  The public also determines 
whether a mark has become famous or generic, and whether confusion 
is likely.264   Under a labor-reward analysis, the public deserves some 
rights to the value that it has created in businesses’ trademarks.  Thus, 
when evaluating the scope of trademark protection, courts should 
consider the public a partial owner of the trademarks at issue.  At the 
very least, the public, including competing businesses, has earned the 
right to use a trademark in non-confusing, non-misleading ways. 
 
2.     Reducing Efficacy of Mark/Trademark Dilution 
 
Another concern courts have tried to remedy through the use of 
initial interest confusion is the possible watering down of the strength of 
a mark if competitors use it in advertising or to describe their own 
unrelated products.  This concern forms the basis for state dilution 
actions and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).  Dilution is 
generally defined as the lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify 
and distinguish goods and services regardless of competition between 
the parties or the likelihood of confusion.265  The appropriateness of 
 
 260 See Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 399. 
 261 See Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1999) 
(no other form of intellectual property depends so much on public for its creation). 
 262 See COOMBE, supra note 229, at 61; see generally Wilf, supra note 261. 
 263 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).  A 
descriptive mark can presumptively be considered to have achieved secondary meaning if it 
becomes incontestable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000). 
 264 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2 (1988). 
 265 See Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Sec. 4 Definition, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000); see also 
ALA. CODE 1975 § 8-12-17 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1448.01 (2003); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 14330 (West 1987); FLORIDA STAT. ANN.  § 495.151 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-
1-451 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-513 (Michie 2003); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 60 (West 
1993); 10 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1530 (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110B § 12 
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dilution law itself is controversial,266 although a recent Supreme Court 
case decided under the FTDA may suggest that dilution is here to 
stay.267  The development of initial interest confusion pre-dated the 
adoption of the FTDA and in some instances may have been applied to 
remedy problems of dilution. 
Concerns over the whittling away of the strength of a mark or the 
tarnishment of a mark’s image are best resolved through a dilution 
analysis.  Dilution applies in situations in which there is no consumer 
confusion.268  Because of the potentially broad scope of dilution law, 
Congress and the courts have sought to strictly limit dilution actions so 
as not to limit more speech than is necessary.  For example, the FTDA 
is limited to famous marks.269  The Act also explicitly excludes 
comparative advertising from its reach so that any tarnishment that 
occurs in a comparison advertisement will not be found diluting.270  The 
Supreme Court recently held that federal dilution actions can only 
succeed if a plaintiff provides evidence of actual dilution; the likelihood 
of dilution is not enough.271  This standard is much higher than that 
required for showing a likelihood of confusion, and as such is more 
speech protective.  Applying the initial interest confusion doctrine to 
remedy acts that should more appropriately be considered under the 
rubric of dilution denies defendants the protections that the dilution 
statute and the First Amendment afford them. 
 
3.     Architecture of the Internet 
 
Finally, the proliferation of the initial interest confusion doctrine 
has been sparked in recent years by a number of problems unique to the 
design of the Internet.  The courts’ application of initial interest 
confusion on the Internet reflects a degree of activism and impatience 
 
(West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.285 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1973); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (McKinney 2005); ORE. 
REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1994); 54 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
25-513 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002); W. VA.. CODE § 47-2-13 
(2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-101(j), 40-1-115 (Michie 2003). 
 266 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:114; Volokh, supra note 196, at 732-39 (questioning 
constitutionality of dilution law); see generally Klieger, supra note 76 (criticizing dilution).  But 
see Schechter, supra note 63  (calling for adoption of anti-dilution laws). 
 267 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).  I note that Moseley 
involved a question of statutory interpretation.  The Supreme Court has not directly considered 
whether the FTDA would withstand a First Amendment challenge. 
 268 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
 269 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 270 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4). 
 271 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.  Congress, however, has recently introduced a bill that would 
lower the standard for dilution back to a likelihood of dilution standard.  See Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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with Congress and the free market to solve some of the problems 
emerging from the new technology.  Unfortunately, by hastily applying 
and expanding trademark law to the Internet context without experience 
or knowledge of the medium, many courts have dramatically missed the 
mark.  For example, numerous courts have repeated the erroneous 
proposition from Brookfield that confusion is more likely on the Internet 
than offline.272  The rationale for this conclusion is in part that an 
Internet user can quickly link or navigate from one website to another.  
This speed, however, does not increase confusion; instead, it allows any 
confusion to be easily and quickly remedied. 
Part of the reason some courts may have missed the mark in the 
Internet context is that few members of the bench grew up as part of a 
cyber-savvy generation.273  While many jurists have quickly gotten up 
to speed, others are not familiar enough with the technology to 
accurately assess what a reasonable Internet consumer would experience 
when surfing the Web.274  The lack of familiarity with Internet 
technology and e-commerce has led to some absurd conclusions about 
the Internet in the context of trademark infringement actions: Not only 
the faulty assumption that confusion is more likely, but also that finding 
information online is more difficult than in the real world, and that 
Internet users will easily give up their searches.275  While this may have 
been somewhat true with a slow 14k dial-up service, it is less true today 
with the frequent use of DSL, cable modem services, Wi-Fi, ISDN, and 
T1 lines.276 
This last point highlights another fundamental problem with 
judicial decision-making in the Internet arena—because the technology 
is ever-changing, courts must be careful not to make decisions that fit 
only unique and narrow circumstances.277  Instead, courts must look at 
the big picture.  Generally, a legal principle—especially one as 
 
 272 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 
(9th Cir. 1999); Northern Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 (D. 
Mass. 2000); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1430, 1434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 273 The author includes herself in this group—and anyone else who graduated college before 
using the Internet, email, and instant messages. 
 274 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in trademark cases judges often consider the 
likelihood of confusion as a question of law rather than of fact. 
 275 See, e.g., OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 
2000); Planned Parenthood, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1435. 
 276 A majority of Internet users today have high-speed access, and this number will only 
increase, especially with the advent of Wi-Fi access in public spaces, such as coffee shops, 
airports and hotels.  See John B. Horrigan, Report for Pew Research Organization (April 2004), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband04.DataMemo.pdf (55% of Internet users now 
have broadband at home or at work). 
 277 Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2003) 
(“Research involving the Internet may become obsolete in a matter of months.”). 
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longstanding and broad-based as trademark law—should be capable of 
application to different media without the need to change its 
fundamental basis.  When an existing and well-established statute or 
legal principle cannot address a problem created by a new technology, 
and no market solutions are available, it is often a sign that legislative—
rather than judicial—action is required.  I will examine two main areas 
in which courts have applied initial interest confusion to address 
trademark problems on the Internet: domain names and search engines. 
 
a.     Domain Names and Cybersquatting 
 
One problem that has troubled courts is the use of trademarks in 
domain names.  As with offline businesses, customers need a way to 
locate a store.  Every site on the web has a unique identification or 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) address.  Although this specific 
Internet Protocol (IP) address is produced using numbers, it is translated 
into plain English to facilitate use by consumers.  Most web addresses 
use the following format: “http://www.cnn.com.”  The domain name is 
only the latter half of the address: “cnn.com.”  Most domain names end 
in “.com,” which is called the top-level domain and is used for most 
online businesses.278  The second-level domain is often the name of the 
company, here the cable news network, CNN.  Domain names are easier 
to remember than IP addresses and are considered prized possessions.  
Only one business can own a domain name, just as there can only be 
one house with a particular address.  Thus, the domain name serves a 
similar function to a street address or phone number. 
There are several potential trademark-related problems that arise in 
the domain name context.279  One is the use of a domain name that 
includes another company’s trademark when both parties have 
legitimate claims to the word used in the domain name.  For example, 
Clue Computing, a company that provides computer support services, 
has a legitimate trademark in its name.  Should Hasbro, Inc. be able to 
prevent it from using the domain name “clue.com” for its website 
simply because Hasbro has a trademarked game called “Clue”?  The 
First Circuit, one of the few circuits not to adopt the initial interest 
 
 278 Other top-level domains include “.edu” for educational institutions, “.gov” for government 
organizations, and “.org” for non-profit organizations. 
 279 My analysis only addresses the issue of potentially infringing uses of trademarks in domain 
names, not the issue of whether domain names are separately trademarkable.  That issue is 
distinct and tends to turn on whether the domain name serves to distinguish a particular product 
or service. 
  
2005] INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION  171 
confusion doctrine, said no,280 but other courts have concluded 
otherwise in similar circumstances.281 
Several courts have applied initial interest confusion in 
circumstances in which they are concerned by the potential confusion 
caused when a web user incorrectly guesses a domain name for a 
website.282  As anyone who regularly uses the Internet knows, guessing 
domain names is a risky proposition, and one’s guess may not always 
lead to the correct website.  The simple fact that consumers may guess 
wrong about a website, however, should not be the basis for a trademark 
infringement action.  When an unsuspecting websurfer types in 
“whitehouse.com” instead of “whitehouse.gov” and gets a pornography 
site rather than the Oval Office, she is not likely to think that the porn 
site is actually the White House or affiliated with the federal 
government.  Consumers may well be sent to an unintended website, but 
that is quite different from being confused as to source, affiliation, or 
sponsorship for trademark infringement purposes.283   
Guessing the wrong website is similar to misdialing a telephone 
number.  Courts thus far have held that the adoption of similar vanity 
numbers in the hopes of profiting from misdialed numbers is a 
legitimate business practice.284  It is possible that if a consumer 
accidentally lands on the wrong site, he might settle for a competitor’s 
product, but this is a risk any time anyone walks into a store and is 
confronted with other purchasing options.  Trademark law was not 
 
 280 Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 281 See, e.g., Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySIMON, Inc., 282 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2002) (online 
comparison shopping service could not use web domain www.mysimon.com because plaintiff 
had trademark in Simon Property Group, a company that owned shopping malls); Brookfield 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (defendant could not 
use moviebuff.com as website for video rental service, even though it had right to use 
“moviebuff” in trademarked slogan, because plaintiff had trademark in “moviebuff” for 
entertainment-related database); see also PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 
243, 250-51 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that seller of used trucks could not use plaintiff’s trademark 
in domain names); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(preventing gripe site with commercial links from using plaintiff’s trademark in website address 
because of “initial interest”).  But see Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 
1002, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing website operated by Mr. Nissan to continue to operate at 
domain “nissan.com”); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 
2002) (allowing use of trademarked term in domain name where parties were not competitors). 
 282 See, e.g., PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 250; Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45; Asia Apparel, 
LLC. v. Ripswear, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-469, 2004 WL 3259009, at * 4 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2004); 
OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81. 
 283 Network Network v. CBS, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (pointing out 
difference between guessing wrong domain site and being confused); Simon Prop., 104 F. Supp. 
2d at 1044 (Internet users’ confusion about where to go next is not trademark confusion). 
 284 See, e.g., Daimlerchrysler A.G. v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2003) (no trademark 
infringement when defendant licensed vanity number 1-800-Mercedes); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 
Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 624-26 (6th Cir. 1996) (no trademark infringement despite 
frequent misdialing of 1800-H0liday v. 1-800-Holiday and intentional choice of similar number 
to profit from misdialed calls). 
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meant to protect the most unsophisticated or least intelligent consumers, 
but instead to evaluate whether a reasonably prudent potential purchaser 
would be confused.  There is no doubt that reasonably prudent Internet 
shoppers will be aware and prepared for the possibility that their guess 
of a domain name will send them to the wrong location.  Courts have 
also greatly exaggerated the burdens of being led to a different website.  
Unlike in the brick and mortar world where one may have gone a 
substantial distance to get to a particular store, websurfers can quickly, 
in a matter of seconds, redirect their web browser away from the 
incorrect site. 
In a case that at first glance appears to move away from some of 
the Ninth Circuit’s more extreme initial interest confusion decisions, the 
Circuit recently allowed a defendant to retain a domain name that used a 
famous trademark in it.285  However, on the basis of the initial interest 
confusion doctrine, the court severely limited the ability of the 
defendant to post advertising on his website.  The Ninth Circuit allowed 
the defendant, Nissan Computer Corporation, owned by Uzi Nissan, to 
continue to use the domain name “nissan.com,” despite Nissan Motor’s 
famous trademark in “Nissan.”  The court held, however, that Mr. 
Nissan could not advertise or provide links to advertisements for cars or 
trucks on his website because they would allow him to benefit from 
misdirected web traffic.286  This holding unreasonably restricts Mr. 
Nissan’s ability to have third-party advertising on his website to help 
support his site and business, including advertisements for automobiles.  
If ads on Mr. Nissan’s website had suggested that the site was affiliated 
or sponsored by Nissan, then they could be enjoined.  Absent such a 
demonstration of likelihood of confusion, the court overstepped its 
bounds by preventing consumers and a business from using online 
advertising in circumstances in which there was no confusion. 
Some domain name disputes involve circumstances in which a 
party without a trademark claim in a domain name reserves a web 
address or domain name containing another’s trademark with the intent 
to extort payment from the actual trademark holder.  This has been 
termed “cybersquatting.”  One motivation for the expansion of the 
initial interest confusion doctrine may have been preventing such 
cybersquatting. 
In 1999, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (ACPA) to remedy the problem of domain name 
confusion and cybersquatters.287  The ACPA created a cause of action 
against defendants who use another’s trademark (or a confusingly 
 
 285 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 286 Id. 
 287 15 U.S.C. §1125 (d)(1)(A) (2000); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5 (1999); Northern 
Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 (D. Mass. 2000). 
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similar mark) in a domain name with the bad faith intent to profit from 
that use.288  The ACPA has largely solved the cybersquatting problem, 
while at the same time adequately protecting the First Amendment 
rights of consumers and competitors.  Significantly, the ACPA allows 
for liability only in circumstances in which a defendant acted with a bad 
faith intent to profit from the plaintiff’s goodwill.289  The ACPA 
remedies one of the Internet-related problems that may have driven the 
misguided expansion of initial interest confusion, without creating the 
problems associated with that doctrine. 
 
b.     Online Searches and Metatags 
 
Courts have also used the initial interest confusion doctrine to 
solve problems that emerge from the use of search engines.  Search 
engines act as intelligent agents for web users, searching text and code 
online and then sorting results to assist web users in locating 
information.  Search engines do not have the same cognitive abilities 
that human beings have and cannot as easily distinguish between 
different trademarks and different uses of trademarks.  As folk-rocker 
Ani DiFranco sings, “we know the difference between the font of ‘20% 
More’ and the font of ‘Teriyaki,’”290 but search engines generally 
cannot make such distinctions.  Intelligent agents are not and may never 
be very good at distinguishing between a slogan saying “this is Coke” 
and one saying “this is better than Coke.”  Similarly, intelligent agents 
cannot evaluate whether a trademark reference constitutes a parody or 
other possible fair use.  Thus, any framework for resolving online 
trademark infringement should not rely on search engines to be the 
arbitrators of trademark law. 
Most search engines are private businesses that rely on profits to 
survive.  Therefore, search results are often driven by financial 
considerations.  A number of companies advise businesses on how to 
increase the likelihood of appearing in search results and how to show 
up towards the beginning of results lists.291  Sometimes search results 
are determined by financial payments to search engines.292  Some search 
 
 288 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 289 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A); see also S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999); Interstellar 
Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2002).  It is important to 
distinguish between people willing to be paid to give up a domain name and those who purchased 
the domain name seeking to profit by selling it to the trademark holder at the outset. 
 290 Ani DiFranco, Fuel, on LITTLE PLASTIC CASTLE (Righteous Babe Records 1998).  
 291 See, e.g., Yahoo! Search Marketing, http://www.overture.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005); 
Register Everywhere, Inc., http://www.registereverywhere.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
 292 See, e.g., Yahoo! Search Marketing, http://www.content.overture.com/d/USm/ays/ (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2005); see also Interstellar Starship Servs., 304 F.3d at 945 n.10; Stefanie Olson, 
Google Plans Trademark Gambit (Apr. 13, 2004), http://news.com.com/ 
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engines use metatags as a way of locating and sorting search results.  
Because some search engines use these metatags as a way of 
determining search results, website designers sometimes include 
metatags that do not directly describe their website in order to have their 
site come up as a search result when consumers look for certain terms 
online.  An astute competitor might include a trademarked term multiple 
times in his metatags and on his website, hoping that his website will 
appear higher up in a search results list.  The more times a term is 
mentioned in a site’s metatags, the more likely that some search engines 
will place the website higher in the search results when that term is used 
for a search.   
Increasingly, however, search engines rely less and less on 
metatags as a way of determining search results, and many search 
engines discount repeated uses of the same terms.293  Despite the fact 
that most search engines no longer use metatags, the bulk of cases 
involving initial interest confusion and the Internet consider the use of 
metatags.  It is therefore important not only to question the validity of 
these decisions on their own terms, but also to understand the logic 
behind these decisions.  These court decisions have been and will 
continue to be applied to other situations online in which website 
designers, advertisers and search engines seek to control which websites 
appear in search result lists when a websurfer enters a trademarked term 
as a search term. 
As discussed, the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield set the widely 
embraced precedent that the use of another’s trademark in the metatags 
of a website is infringing.294  Recall that in Brookfield, the defendant, 
West Coast, used the term “moviebuff” in the description and keyword 
metatags for its video rental store’s website.  In describing its holding, 
the Brookfield court used an analogy patently inapplicable to the case 
and to the Internet.  The court likened West Coast’s actions to the 
following brick and mortar situation: 
Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a 
sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store.  Suppose West 
Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts up a billboard on 
a highway reading—“West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7”—
where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is 
located at Exit 7.  Customers looking for West Coast’s store will pull 
off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.  Unable to locate West 
Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway 
entrance, they may simply rent there.  Even consumers who prefer 
 
2100-1038_3-5190324.html. 
 293 See supra note 41; see also Goldman, supra note 13, at 567 (determining that since 2002 
only one major search engine still uses metatags). 
 294 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching 
for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there.295 
The court’s analogy is wrong on many levels.296  First, the use of 
another’s trademark in metatags is nothing like posting a competitor’s 
trademarked name on a sign in front of one’s store.  Metatags are never 
seen by consumers and, therefore, cannot directly serve to pass off one 
person’s good for those of another.  Second, West Coast never 
suggested that it was Brookfield or that it sold Brookfield’s MovieBuff 
database product.297  A more applicable analogy to the actual case 
would be a Blockbuster advertisement saying “Blockbuster is the best 
videostore on the West Coast.  Exit 7.”298 
The brick and mortar analogy is also off-base because it 
overestimates the difficulty in returning to the Internet Highway.  It 
takes seconds to click back to a prior webpage or search result list, or to 
redirect to another website online, whereas driving off and on the 
freeway could take many minutes if not longer.  Despite the absurdity of 
the freeway analogy, it has spread like wildfire and is cited without 
reflection as the basis for finding trademark infringement on the 
Internet.299 
The Brookfield decision is also highly suspect because the court’s 
notion that users were “taken” to West Coast’s website is grossly 
inaccurate.300  The use of this language suggests that the panel was 
unfamiliar with the Internet and with search engines—users are not 
hijacked to particular sites after using a search engine, but instead are 
given a list of links which they can then choose to navigate to or not.  
Furthermore, as discussed, West Coast’s website was clearly labeled in 
the search results, so it was unlikely that anyone went to that website 
thinking it was something other than the West Coast Video site. 
Since the time of Brookfield, market forces have remedied some of 
the courts’ concerns related to online searches.  Internet search engines 
 
 295 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 296 A number of other scholars have criticized Brookfield’s highway analogy.  See, e.g., Dogan 
& Lemley, supra note 13, at 815-16; Klein & Glazer, supra note 13, at 1060 (criticizing 
Brookfield highway analogy).  But see McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters, supra note 12, at 
235-36 (complimenting the “nice” billboard hypothetical based on a “metaphor” he had 
proposed). 
 297 The Brookfield court also made much of the fact that West Coast omitted the space 
between “movie” and “buff.”  This logic again suggests a lack of familiarity with the technology 
and with the industry practice.  Online search engines do not generally differentiate between 
capital letters and lower case ones or between words with and without spaces.  Thus, online there 
is little difference between “movie buff,” “moviebuff” and “MovieBuff.” 
 298 Because the motto of West Coast included “movie buff” and “movie buff” is a legitimate 
term to associate with a video rental store, use of the term in the metatags and text of the website 
should not have been deemed infringing.  See discussion infra at Part I.C. 
 299 See supra note 36. 
 300 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. 
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now more clearly label search results and differentiate links from 
advertisements or sponsored (or paid) links.301  Some of these changes 
are no doubt driven by potential liability, but many of them also make 
good business sense because consumers can more easily find what they 
are looking for and search engines can profit from companies paying for 
the prominent sponsored links and advertisements. 
Even though Congress and the market itself have subsequently 
solved some of the more troubling problems with the Internet that led to 
the expansion of the initial interest confusion doctrine, the courts have 
let the genie out of the bottle.  Now, speech over the Internet is severely 
chilled by the misguided doctrine, and the plethora of Internet-based 
initial interest confusion precedents are being used in offline contexts to 
hold liable individuals and companies in situations that would not 
previously have been actionable. 
 
IV.     FAIR USE IS NOT AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION 
 
Some scholars have suggested that the best way to put a stop to the 
expansion of trademark protection is to more vigilantly apply fair use in 
the trademark context.302  This approach is flawed.  First, and most 
importantly, it has not worked to date.  Despite pleas to broaden the 
application of fair use, courts often reject the defense in circumstances 
in which it should apply.  Even when courts uphold the fair use defense, 
their decisions are inconsistent and unpredictable; therefore, defendants 
cannot safely rely on the defense.303   
Additionally, the fair use defense provided by the Lanham Act 
applies only when a trademark is being used in a non-trademark sense 
to describe the defendant’s own goods or services.304  The Act provides 
a defense when a word is used not as a mark, but as “descriptive of and 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of 
such party, or their geographic origins.”305  For example, a vintner with 
a trademarked name of Napa Valley Winery could not prevent others 
from indicating that their grapes were grown in the Napa Valley region 
 
 301 Notably, this was already the case in the Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications 
Corp. case, yet the Ninth Circuit found this differentiation to be insufficient.  See Playboy Enters. 
v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 302 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 423-24 (arguing that broader application of the fair 
use defense could remedy expansion of trademark law); cf. LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 217  (relying on fair use to compensate for their proposed 
expansion of copyright protection). 
 303 See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS. 
187, 205 (2004) (describing unpredictable application of fair use defense). 
 304 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 305 Id. 
  
2005] INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION  177 
of California.  The statute does not provide a defense, however, when 
reference is made to the trademarked good or service itself.  For 
example, the defense would not apply to an advertisement that said 
“Stag’s Leap’s Cabernet far surpasses that of Napa Valley Winery.”  
Therefore, the statutory fair use defense does not resolve the problem in 
most initial interest confusion cases because in most cases a defendant 
is referring to the trademarked product or service of another rather than 
describing its own good. 
In some circuits, though not all, the possible fair use defense to 
trademark infringement has been expanded beyond the statutory 
grounds.  As discussed, the statutory fair use defense does not allow the 
use of a mark in its trademark sense; therefore, comparison 
advertisements, commentary on trademarked goods and services, as 
well as objective references to trademarked products, are not protected 
by the traditional fair use defense.  To remedy this problem, the Ninth 
Circuit developed the nominative fair use defense in New Kids on the 
Block v. News America Publishing Inc.306  The nominative fair use 
defense allows a defendant to “use[] a trademark to describe the 
plaintiff’s product, rather than its own.”307  The defense specifically 
applies when: 
First, the product or service in question [is] one not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of 
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify 
the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that 
would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.308 
Though a step in the right direction, the nominative fair use 
defense is not an adequate remedy to solve the problems created by 
initial interest confusion.  As an initial matter, not all circuits have 
adopted the defense.309  Moreover, there is a dispute over whether 
confusing uses can ever be fair uses.310  New Kids explicitly limits 
 
 306 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).  As Judge Kozinski describes, without being able to use a 
trademark, “[m]uch useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if 
speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, 
company or product by using its trademark.”  Id. at 306-07. 
 307 Id. at 308. 
 308 Id. 
 309 See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“This circuit has never followed the nominative fair use analysis . . . .  We are not inclined to 
adopt the [nominative fair use analysis] here.”); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns. Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 
2005 WL 464688, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (“The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has not ruled on the applicability of the nominative fair use defense, nor the standards by which a 
claim of nominative fair use should be evaluated.”); Bijur Lubricating Corp. v. Devco Corp., 332 
F. Supp. 2d 722, 733-34 n.6 (D.N.J. 2004) (3d Circuit has not addressed issue of nominative fair 
use). 
 310 See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:11 (if there is a likelihood of confusion, defendant 
cannot avail itself of the nominative fair use defense).  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
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nominative fair use to situations in which the public is not deceived.311  
The nominative fair use defense, therefore, essentially devolves simply 
to a likelihood of confusion analysis.  Many of the initial interest 
confusion scenarios that I have described involve situations in which 
there is no likelihood of confusion; however, because courts have 
deemed initial interest confusion to meet the standard of likelihood of 
confusion, such cases might be considered deceptive for purposes of 
applying New Kids. 
The nominative fair use defense has also been repeatedly rejected 
in initial interest confusion cases, even in circuits that recognize the 
defense.  The Brookfield court, for example, rejected a nominative fair 
use defense for West Coast’s use of “moviebuff” in its metatags.312  In 
Netscape Communications, the Ninth Circuit rejected a nominative fair 
use defense because the banner advertisements on a website were not 
clearly labeled.313  Most troubling for the usefulness of a nominative fair 
use defense in the initial interest confusion context, the Netscape court 
suggested that because the advertisers could communicate their message 
without keying to Playboy’s trademarked terms, even labeling the 
advertisements might not allow for a fair use defense.314  Many courts 
have also rejected parody as a fair use defense to trademark 
infringement—cabining consideration of parody to the likelihood of 
confusion analysis.315  Thus, fair use on its own cannot adequately limit 
the excesses of the initial interest confusion doctrine. 
 
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004), did not decide 
the issue.  In KP Permanent, the Supreme Court suggested that at least some confusion must be 
tolerated in the context of the statutory fair use defense when descriptive marks are at issue.  The 
Court did not address the validity of the nominative fair use defense or its parameters.  Nor did 
the Court delineate whether confusion could ever be a basis to defeat a fair use defense. 
 311 New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
 312 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 
1999); see also Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003); Wells 
Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762-63 (E.D. Mich. 2003).  But see 
Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 313 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 314 Id. 
 315 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (considering parody 
as factor in likelihood of confusion analysis, but rejecting parody as affirmative defense to 
trademark infringement claim); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 463 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[A] parody . . . still runs afoul of the trademark laws if it is likely to confuse 
consumers.”); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(rejecting initial interest confusion doctrine because parody was considered initially confusing); 
see also COOMBE, supra note 229, at 75 (not clear that parody is a defense under trademark law); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 31:154; Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1207(b)(x). 
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V.     PROPOSED REFORMS 
A.     Eliminate Initial Interest Confusion and 
Reclaim Pre-Sale Confusion 
 
Courts should reject the initial interest confusion doctrine either by 
taking the issue en banc and reversing it, or by not adopting the doctrine 
in their circuit.  If necessary, the issue should be heard by the Supreme 
Court and resolved clearly and decisively.  The likelihood of consumers 
being distracted, interested, diverted or attracted to another product or 
service does not and should not constitute trademark infringement or 
unfair competition.  Simply put, providing consumers choices should 
not form the basis of trademark infringement.  The Lanham Act requires 
a demonstration that confusion, mistake or deception is likely.  
Moreover, as discussed, sound public policy and the framework of 
trademark law require a showing of likely confusion before trademark 
infringement can be found. 
Nevertheless, trademark infringement can and should be found 
when consumers are likely to be confused, even if this confusion 
precedes the time of sale.  As discussed, such confusion harms 
consumers and unfairly trades off another’s goodwill through deception.  
Such confusion was explicitly made actionable by the 1962 
amendments to the Lanham Act.316  To remedy this wrong—without 
creating the host of problems inherent in initial interest confusion—
“initial interest confusion” should be eliminated and replaced with the 
more precise framework of “pre-sale confusion.”  The shift to pre-sale 
confusion will clearly establish that simply causing “initial interest” 
cannot form the basis of a trademark infringement action. 
While some courts that use the term “initial interest confusion” do 
limit the action to circumstances in which there is a demonstration of 
likely confusion prior to the time of sale, many courts use the term to 
mean both pre-sale confusion and initial interest absent likely 
confusion.317  Several scholars who have criticized the recent expansion 
of the initial interest confusion doctrine have suggested that courts 
should simply be more stringent about requiring a showing of the 
 
 316 In this respect, the First Circuit is off-base in rejecting trademark infringement in instances 
in which likely confusion occurs prior to or after the point of purchase.  See, e.g., Astra Pharm. 
Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1993) (limiting 
confusion analysis to time of purchase). 
 317 See discussion supra Part II; see also RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF 
CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 1:7 (2004) (describing initial interest confusion as trademark 
infringement based on “initial interest” that is caused by initial confusion which is later 
dispelled); see also Klein & Glazer, supra note 13, at 1035-38 (using initial interest confusion 
and pre-sale confusion interchangeably). 
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likelihood of confusion.318  For example, Stacey Dogan and Mark 
Lemley, in their recent article criticizing a number of cases involving 
the use of trademarks on the Internet, maintain that initial interest 
confusion remains a “useful lens.”  Despite criticizing the application of 
the doctrine in specific cases, they ultimately conclude that the law does 
not need changing.319  In their minds, courts simply need to do a better 
job of applying the likelihood of confusion standard.  Although I agree 
with many of their criticisms of the application of the doctrine, their 
solution of encouraging courts to more stringently apply the existing 
likelihood of confusion standard is overly optimistic given the vast 
number of precedents decided over several decades that use the term 
“initial interest confusion” in circumstances where there is no 
confusion.  As I have discussed, the term itself is misleading, and courts 
will not be able to undo the damage caused by precedents applying the 
doctrine without starting anew.  Even though initial interest confusion 
could be limited to circumstances in which likely confusion is 
demonstrated, the best way to stop the doctrinal creep that has resulted 
from the use of the term “initial interest” is to completely eliminate it.  
The use of the term pre-sale confusion will firmly focus courts’ 
attention on the likelihood of confusion requirement.  As long as the 
phrase “initial interest” is thrown into the mix, at least some courts will 
be diverted from the confusion requirement.  Moreover, establishing a 
clearly delineated pre-sale confusion analysis allows the scope of 
liability for such confusion to be strictly limited.  My recommendations 
for limiting pre-sale confusion are discussed below: 
 
1.     Should Consider Only Reasonably Prudent Potential Purchasers 
 
Only confusion as to source, sponsorship or affiliation is actionable 
as trademark infringement.  Confusion unrelated to the identification 
and distinguishing of goods and the companies involved in making or 
sponsoring those goods is irrelevant.  Even though actionable confusion 
can occur both before and after the time of sale, as well as among 
individuals who never actually consummate a purchase, consideration 
of confusion should be limited to that of potential purchasers.320   
This limitation is supported by the legislative history to the 1962 
amendment to the Lanham Act, which removed the word “purchasers,” 
 
 318 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 837-38; Cody, supra note 13, at 684-85 
(suggesting remedy that courts apply likelihood of confusion factors to initial interest confusion 
analysis). 
 319 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 838. 
 320 H.R. REP. NO.87-1108, at 4 (1961); see also Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. 
Group, 376 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2004); Elec. Design & Sales v. Elec. Data Sys., 954 F.2d 713, 716 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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but made clear that it was broadening consideration only to “potential 
purchasers,” not to the general population.321  Simply as a policy 
matter, courts and juries should only consider potential purchasers.  
People who are not likely to buy a particular product or category of 
good are much more likely to be confused than potential purchasers.  
Furthermore, their confusion is irrelevant because it will not harm them 
or the goodwill of the businesses involved.322 
When evaluating trademark infringement, courts should focus on 
the reasonably prudent potential purchaser.323  In the Internet context, 
courts should consider what a reasonable online shopper would think 
when faced with an allegedly infringing use.  This does not mean that 
courts should evaluate only what a professional hacker or computer 
science major would think but simply that the first-time Internet user 
should not be the litmus test of whether a pop-up ad or search result is 
confusing.324  In addition, courts should keep in mind that as users 
become more familiar with new technology, it will become less likely 
that they will be confused.  Crucially, courts should not short-circuit the 
likelihood of confusion analysis when analyzing pre-sale confusion.  
Instead, they should review all of the factors that normally would be 
reviewed if confusion occurred at the time of sale. 
 
2.     De Minimis Pre-Sale Confusion Should not be Actionable 
 
At the outset, it is important to set forth what type of pre-sale 
confusion matters.  Findings of infringement on the basis of pre-sale 
confusion should be limited to circumstances in which there is more 
than de minimis confusion.325  Allowing de minimis confusion is 
necessary to give competitors sufficient freedom to compete and to 
express themselves without fear of liability.  Many courts considering 
an initial interest confusion theory have rejected the possibility that de 
minimis confusion is harmless, and find any, even momentary, 
 
 321 H.R. REP. NO. 87-1108, at 4. 
 322 But see MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:76 (suggesting that the 1962 amendments 
broadened the Lanham Act to consider confusion of anyone, including consumers who are not 
potential purchasers); 3A ALTMAN, supra note 37, § 21:1 (suggesting that potential confusion of 
anyone is actionable). 
 323 Using a reasonably-prudent-potential-purchaser standard is not a novel suggestion, but 
many courts have not applied this standard, especially in the initial interest confusion context. 
 324 Trademark law protects neither the dimwitted nor the inexperienced.  In a situation where 
goods are traded among experienced wholesalers, rather than the public at large, one should only 
consider whether wholesalers would be confused. 
 325 The legal term de minimis is short hand for the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex which 
“loosely translated [means] that the law does not take notice of, or concern itself, with very small 
or trifling matters.”  STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF 
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 306 (2003). 
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confusion a basis for trademark infringement.326  Because making pre-
sale confusion actionable greatly expands the circumstances in which 
trademark infringement can be found and it is more difficult to assess 
than point-of-sale confusion, it is important to limit pre-sale confusion 
to circumstances which are more than de minimis.  Moreover, in 
contrast to point-of-sale confusion, in pre-sale confusion situations there 
is time for the confusion to be remedied before there is likely to be a 
significant impact on the consumer.  De minimis confusion is therefore 
not likely to significantly harm consumers or trademark holders. 
In evaluating whether pre-sale confusion is merely de minimis, 
courts should consider a consumer’s likely expenditure of time and 
money as a result of the pre-sale confusion.  Of the few courts that have 
applied a de minimis confusion analysis in the initial interest confusion 
context, most have linked the analysis to situations in which the 
“ultimate purchase decision” is not affected.327  But that is a troubling 
standard because it punishes fair competition.  Once again, it puts the 
emphasis solely on business interests rather than on consumers.  The 
point is not whether a defendant profits from reference to another’s 
trademark but whether potential purchasers are likely to be confused.  
Moreover, this approach ignores the Lanham Act’s broadening out in 
1962 to consider confusion that does not relate to purchasing. 
It is true that even de minimis confusion may make it more likely 
that a consumer will purchase a defendant’s product because the 
consumer may have more positive feelings towards a product due to an 
association with the trademark holder’s product.328  It is not easy, 
however, to evaluate what affects a consumer’s purchasing choices.  
Subliminal reactions should therefore not be actionable.329  Moreover, 
de minimis confusion may in fact build interest in a trademark holder’s 
product and ultimately be a form of free advertising.330 
 
 326 See, e.g, Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th 
Cir. 1999); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d 
on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star Inc., 105 F. 
Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also discussion supra  Part II.D. 
 327 See, e.g.,  Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 
(1st Cir. 1983) (holding that temporary confusion in the context of sophisticated purchasers that 
was undoubtedly cleared up by the time or purchase was “de minimus”); CCBN.Com. Inc v. C-
Call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999) (rejecting infringement claim based on 
streetevents.com versus streetfusion.com because confusion was de minimis); see also Sharrock, 
supra note 13, at 75-76 (suggesting limiting initial interest confusion to situations in which 
ultimate purchasing decision is affected). 
 328 See generally Gerald M. Kosicki, The Media Priming Effect: News Media and 
Considerations Affecting Political Judgments, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 63 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002). 
 329 See Jennifer Kahn, The Bogus Science of Cool, WIRED,  Oct. 2004, at 138, 142 (describing 
difficulty in evaluating consumer responses to commercial stimuli when tracked by MRIs). 
 330 Cf. LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 153-54 (describing in 
copyright context how de minimis quotations of original works increase demand and interest in 
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Additionally, to the extent that there is some positive association 
made based on de minimis pre-sale confusion, trademark holders have 
other avenues to remedy this supposed wrong.  To the extent that the 
association is very strong, a defendant’s actions may rise to the level of 
dilution and be separately actionable under such a theory.  For example, 
Herbrozac should not be found to infringe Prozac’s trademark, but Eli 
Lilly might be able to establish evidence of actual dilution of its mark 
because of the similarity of the trade names.331 
Limiting actionable confusion to that which is more than de 
minimis allows for the use of disclaimers to remedy short-lived pre-sale 
confusion.  For example, if a websurfer looking for the United Airlines 
website accidentally types in “untied.com” instead of “united.com” and 
finds herself at a site that criticizes United Airlines and immediately 
realizes that she is not at the United site, there should be no pre-sale 
confusion action.  Her confusion is momentary; she has expended no 
money and very little time as a result of the confusion.  She can easily 
click back and retype her domain name or visit a search engine to find 
the proper United site.  This should be true even though the Untied site 
provides links to airlines that compete with United.  Requiring a 
showing of more than de minimis confusion maximizes the public good 
by narrowly defining trademark protection. 
 
3.     Other Suggested Limits on Doctrine are Flawed 
 
Some courts and scholars have tried to limit the initial interest 
confusion doctrine.  The suggested restrictions, however, inadequately 
protect both consumers and legitimate competitors in the marketplace.  I 
have already critiqued one such suggestion—the requirement that the 
ultimate purchasing decision be affected.332  Another suggested limit on  
initial interest confusion is to apply the doctrine only to situations in 
which the defendant intended to confuse consumers.333  A recent 
decision by the Second Circuit adopted this approach for initial interest 
confusion cases involving the Internet.334  The basis for this additional 
requirement online is the ease with which “consumers diverted on the 
Internet [can] get back on track.”335  There is no statutory or historical 
 
original work). 
 331 See discussion supra Parts II.B.2.b and III.B.2. 
 332 See discussion supra Part V.A.2. 
 333 See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1278-80 (D. Ore. 
2001) (limiting initial interest confusion to circumstances involving bad faith (citing Hasbro, Inc. 
v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000))). 
 334 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 335 Id. 
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basis for adding the requirement of demonstrating intent.336  In fact, 
much to the contrary, the statute and legislative history expressly allow 
injunctive relief absent a showing of intent.  As discussed, consumers 
and businesses must be protected even from unintentional deception.  
Thus, the added requirement of proving intent is not an acceptable 
solution to the excesses of initial interest confusion.337 
Some courts and scholars have suggested that when a defendant 
does not compete with the plaintiff, initial interest confusion should not 
be actionable.338  For example, the Ninth Circuit in Interstellar Starship 
Services Ltd. v. Epix Inc.339 held that a defendant could use a plaintiff’s 
trademarked term “epix” in its domain name because the two businesses 
did not sell competing products.340  The defendant advertised a cabaret 
show accompanying a local screening of The Rocky Horror Picture 
Show, whereas the plaintiff sold digital imaging products.341  The 
Interstellar Starship court suggested that initial interest confusion could 
occur only if the two parties were selling competing products.342   
The court correctly rejected the application of initial interest 
confusion to the facts of the case, but its limitation of trademark 
 
 336 Congress wrote in an intent requirement for recovery of economic damages, but not for 
injunctive relief.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) (2000).  Congress specifically left out of the 
Lanham Act the requirement of demonstrating intent, which was an element of the common law 
action for deceit. 
 337 A recent student note suggests that in the Internet context, initial interest confusion should 
apply only when there is an intent to “free-rid[e]” on the trademark holder’s business.  See 
Confusion in Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 2409-10; see also Maynard, supra note 13, at 1349-
50 (suggesting that initial interest confusion be limited to circumstances in which a defendant acts 
in bad faith).  As I discuss, an intent requirement underprotects consumers and trademark holders.  
The note’s suggestion is additionally flawed because it is based solely on a showing of intent to 
compete and would prevent lawful competition absent any showing of likely confusion.  See 
discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 338 See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295-97 (3d Cir. 2001); 
see also Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that computer company using word “nissan” in domain name cannot advertise 
automobiles without violating trademark rights of Nissan Motor Co.); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that confusion is more 
likely if a competitor’s website sells similar products); Golden West Fin. v. WMA Mortgage 
Servs., No. C 02-05727, 2003 WL 1343019, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003) (limiting 
Brookfield to situation of competitors); Network Network v. CBS, No. CV 98-1349,  2000 WL 
362016, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2000); Chatam Int’l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 
549, 558-59 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119-20 (D. 
Minn. 2000) (stating that initial interest confusion is only actionable when there is commercial 
gain); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 826; Maynard, supra note 13, at 1349; Confusion in 
Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 2408-09. 
 339 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 340 Id. at 943-46. 
 341 Id. at 938-40. 
 342 Id. at 943-46.  The Interstellar Starship court suggests that the Lanham Act has a 
component that requires that a defendant be able to capitalize off misdirecting traffic; however, 
nowhere in the Lanham Act is such a requirement set forth.  Id.  As discussed, the impact on 
business is not a direct consideration under the explicit language of the Act.   
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infringement to circumstances in which businesses are competing does 
not conform with the requirements and purposes of trademark law.  The 
limiting of initial interest confusion to competitive situations defies 
logic because any initial interest confusion would likely precede the 
discovery that products were different (i.e., non-competing); therefore 
the relatedness of the products is not highly relevant to consumer 
confusion. Moreover, because consumers can be misled even when non-
competing goods are involved, limiting actionable confusion to 
competitive situations does not adequately protect consumers. 
Courts must strike a careful balance between reducing likely 
confusion and allowing fair competition; however, it does not make 
sense for this balance to turn on the basis of competition itself.  Direct 
competitors need to be able to mention a competitor’s trademark.  Such 
comparative advertisements and commentary are necessary for fair 
competition, promotion of consumer interests and free speech.  At the 
same time, confusion caused by non-competitors should be actionable 
because it may harm consumers.  For example, suppose a company 
named itself Sony and started selling cars under that name.  A consumer 
might be more inclined to purchase a car from Sony, mistakenly 
thinking that the car was manufactured by the Sony that makes first-rate 
electronics.  This confusion should be actionable if consumers are likely 
to be confused even if the famous Sony Corporation does not sell cars 
and will, therefore, not lose any money from the confusion.  Why?  
Because the consumer’s confusion may have led him to buy a car he 
otherwise might not have bought.  The limitation of initial interest 
confusion to competing situations again demonstrates the misguided 
focus on producers rather than consumers when analyzing trademark 
claims.  Moreover, to the extent that the competitive proximity of two 
products or services increases the likelihood of confusion, such 
competitive proximity is already considered as part of the traditional 
likelihood of confusion analysis. 
Applying the proposed pre-sale confusion doctrine would remedy 
the troubling outcomes in a host of cases that have applied the initial 
interest confusion doctrine.  West Coast would not have been held liable 
for trademark infringement for using “moviebuff” in its metatags.  
Natural Answers would not have committed trademark infringement for 
using Herbrozac to name its natural anti-depressant.  Penguin Books 
would not have infringed Dr. Seuss’s mark with its book The Cat Not in 
the Hat.  In each of these instances there was no likelihood of 
confusion.  Under the pre-sale confusion doctrine, absent such a 
showing, trademark infringement could not be found. 
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B.     Pre-Sale Confusion Analysis Applies Equally to the Internet 
 
The pre-sale confusion doctrine does not require special rules for 
the Internet.  The bulk of commentators that have criticized initial 
interest confusion have suggested that it should not apply online or that 
different rules should apply to the Internet.343  As a general principle, I 
reject the notion that laws, especially long-standing tort and intellectual 
property laws, need to be changed when applied to a new medium.344  It 
is true that when a new medium presents itself courts are often 
presented with novel facts and circumstances that result in different 
outcomes, but the likelihood of confusion test works equally well online 
and offline.  The pre-sale confusion doctrine would apply with equal 
force, and without need for alteration, to the Internet. 
For example, in evaluating the question of whether using another’s 
trademarks in metatags can ever be confusing, current trademark law 
and the pre-sale confusion doctrine provide sufficient answers.  While 
many scholars to date have treated the metatag question as an all-or-
none question,345 the answer depends on the specifics of the use of the 
mark in the metatags.  Where courts have gone astray is not in holding 
that the use of trademarks in metatags can be confusing, but in holding 
that such uses are always confusing.  Because search engines, using 
both humans and intelligent agents, search the web and provide search 
results upon which consumers rely, there is a convincing argument that 
the use of metatags that deceive search engines should constitute 
trademark infringement even though most consumers do not see the 
tags.  If words used in the keyword or description metatags do not 
accurately describe those websites, then they are deceptive and may 
provide grounds for trademark infringement.  If the metatags fairly 
describe the website or the category of product, however, then they 
 
 343 See supra note 13. 
 344 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 283, 331 (2001); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(questioning why Congress chose to change traditional defamation in online context).  But see 
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 31:152 (suggesting that medium is key to determining 
infringement); BIEGEL, supra note 325, at 25-49 (discussing different approaches to applying the 
law on the Internet). 
 345 See, e.g., Bakken, supra note 13, at 27-28 (suggesting that metatags are not confusing 
because consumers do not see them); Yelena Dunaevsky, Comment, Don’t Confuse Metatags 
with Initial Interest Confusion, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 1378 (2002) (same); Kurt M. 
Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 552-57 (2002) (suggesting that absent fair use defense, use of another’s 
trademark in metatags is confusing); Rachel Jane Posner, Note, Manipulative Metatagging, 
Search Engine Baiting & Initial Interest Confusion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 505 
(2000) (agreeing with Brookfield that use of another’s trademark in metatag is infringing). 
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should not constitute trademark infringement even if a defendant uses 
another’s trademark in the tags. 
In the Brookfield case, West Coast should not have been held liable 
for using “moviebuff” to describe its website.  Its trademarked slogan 
included the word “movie buff,” a generic term for a movie enthusiast; 
thus, there is nothing deceptive or confusing about describing its site 
with a metatag using the word “moviebuff.”  Similarly, Garcia should 
be able to use the term “Pycnogenol” in the metatags for his website 
selling the identical herbal supplement under the brand name 
Masquelier.  The use of the term “Pycnogenol” accurately describes the 
website because Masquelier is a similar product to Pycnogenol and 
consumers should be able to compare them.  The description is also 
accurate because Pycnogenol is the name used in the scientific studies 
of the product and the product is sold under that trademark in Europe 
and other countries. 
When a metatag misrepresents a website, this deception should be 
used as evidence of likely confusion.  For example, in Niton Corp. v. 
Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.,346 the defendant, Radiation 
Monitoring, copied all of the plaintiff’s metatags and used them for its 
own website.  Those metatags were deceptive because they included 
terms that had no relevance to Radiation’s own website or products.  
One of the listed keywords was “radon,” something neither used in 
Radiation’s products nor referred to in the website.  Most significantly, 
Radiation described itself in its source code as the “Home Page of Niton 
Corporation.”347  These tags do not accurately describe the site or 
product of Radiation and are likely to cause confusion as to source, 
sponsorship, or affiliation.  Thus, under the pre-sale confusion doctrine 
likely confusion would be found.  If this confusion were not de minimis, 
i.e., quickly resolved upon landing on the website, it would be 
actionable infringement.  Because of Radiation’s claim that it was the 
home page for Niton, there is a likelihood that such pre-sale confusion 
would not quickly be remedied because websurfers would likely be 
convinced that they had chosen the correct site for Niton. 
Other Internet-based trademark questions have and will arise (such 
as pop-up ads, keyed advertisements, deep-linking, and framing)348 and 
 
 346 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 347 Id. at 104. 
 348 I have already discussed pop-up ads and banner ads.  Deep-linking arises when one website 
takes you to another website but skips the home page of the website and perhaps several other 
pages that a websurfer would normally have to go through if he accessed a website directly.  An 
example of deep-linking follows: suppose I go to Usher’s website to buy tickets for one of his 
concerts and click on a link saying “buy tickets for the Los Angeles concert date,” and am then 
taken to the Ticketmaster website and the exact page where one can buy tickets for this concert.  
By deeplinking me to this page, Usher’s website has allowed me to bypass many webpages of the 
Ticketmaster site, and probably numerous paid advertisements that Ticketmaster had hoped I 
would read.  Under the pre-sale confusion test, so long as I know that I’m at the Ticketmaster 
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they can all be resolved using the pre-sale confusion and likelihood of 
confusion tests.  Thus, the pre-sale confusion test works equally well in 
both online and offline situations and allows fair competition consistent 
with the requirements of the First Amendment, the Lanham Act, the 
policies underlying trademark protection, and other intellectual property 
laws. 
 
C.     Structural Changes to the Internet 
 
Even with the application of the pre-sale confusion doctrine, there 
may still be some instances online in which a trademark holder’s 
website gets buried in search results.  This problem should not be 
remedied by expanding legal doctrine or legislation, but instead by 
making some structural changes to webpage design and search engine 
algorithms.  Such changes will likely come about naturally through 
market forces.  These changes will be superior to judicial and 
congressional second-guessing because Internet businesses can adapt 
much more rapidly to evolving technology.  It is not the role of 
trademark law to solve every possible business problem for trademark 
holders. 
Many Internet-related issues confronting courts such as banner 
advertisements, keyed advertisements, the use of metatags, and the 
order and content of search results are products of the way search 
engines work.  Several possible structural changes to webpages and 
search engine algorithms could remedy some of these problems.  For 
example, search engines could require web designers to use source code 
that identifies a “Trademark Metatag.”349  The Trademark Metatag 
would identify the trademark name of the owner or sponsor of a 
website.  Only the lawful trademark holder would be able to use the 
trademark in the Trademark Metatag.  Search results could then be 
 
website when I buy my tickets there is no likely confusion.  If I thought I was buying them from 
Usher then there could be actionable confusion. 
  Framing occurs when one website links to another but frames the new website with its own 
advertising or text.  The standard likelihood of confusion and pre-sale confusion analyses can 
resolve such cases. 
 349 I am not the first to make such a proposal.  Dan McCuaig also suggested such a solution in 
his article, Halve the Baby: An Obvious Solution to the Troubling Use of Trademarks as 
Metatags, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 643 (2000).  Despite McCuaig’s suggestion 
that the solution was “obvious,” it has not been undertaken five years later.  Given the changing 
legal climate, there may be more interest in the suggestion today.  Another possible solution 
proposed by James A. Rossi is to add another top level domain for trademark holders.  See Rossi, 
supra note 12, at 348.  This is a good idea, but will have problems when there are two legitimate 
trademark holders and will not address the use of trademarks in the metatags or websites of 
competitors or non-competitors. 
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organized with the trademark results separated out from the other 
results. 
Search engines and trademark holders have a strong incentive to 
put such a system in place.  Consumers who are looking for the website 
of the trademark owner will prefer to have that result at the top of the 
list, and the trademark holder would obviously benefit as well.  Some 
search engines could provide consumers a choice—Google could have a 
box that you check if you want only results with trademark holders of 
the term you entered.  For example, if I only wanted the official iTunes 
website, I could check the box, but if I wanted to see other services I 
could do a broader-based search.  Using the Trademark Metatag would 
protect trademark holders, but it would also benefit consumers by 
allowing websurfers to compare similar products and review 
commentaries about trademarked products.  This result best promotes 
fair competition, free speech, and the public interest.  The use of the 
Trademark Metatag would be enforced by the traditional likelihood of 
confusion analysis.  If a non-trademark holder used a trademark in its 
Trademark Metatag, that would be grounds for a finding of either 
trademark infringement or unfair competition.  Because such a use 
would likely be in bad faith, a defendant would be liable for damages. 
Because search engines are more useful the more relevant their 
results are, there is an incentive for search engines to continually work 
to improve the algorithms they use to sort search results.  Search engine 
technology will continually evolve—search engines are the yellow 
pages and card catalogues of the 21st Century—and courts and 
Congress should give them a wide berth to develop and improve rather 




The expansion of trademarks in recent years in a variety of areas 
makes the need to reign in the initial interest confusion doctrine even 
more pressing.  As several scholars have noted, trademarks have 
increasingly become entities separate and apart from particular goods 
and services.350  Trademark infringement actions used to be limited to 
 
 
 350 See Litman, Breakfast for Batman, supra note 63, at 1721-25 (describing variety of ways in 
which there has been a vast expansion of trademark protection); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999); see generally 
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 situations in which a defendant used a plaintiff’s trademark to identify 
the origin of its counterfeit good.  The shift towards treating the value of 
trademarks as something separate and apart from any indication of 
origin, or even of a particular product, greatly broadens the conduct that 
can be blocked by infringement actions.  As such, trademarks are 
rapidly approaching property rights in gross.  Each trademark holder has 
an incentive to push its trademark protections as far as they will go.  It 
is the duty of Congress and the courts to vigilantly guard against such 
excesses and to protect both the public and the free market system from 
such aggressive efforts. 
Initial interest confusion is such an excess, and one which, despite 
violating the express terms of the Lanham Act, thus far has been 
extremely successful.  It is time for courts to revisit the doctrine.  Each 
court of appeals has the ability to reject initial interest confusion and to 
embrace in its place the more limited analysis of “pre-sale confusion”—
according to the guidelines set forth above—carefully limiting 
actionable pre-sale confusion to situations in which there is likely 
confusion by reasonably prudent potential purchasers that exists prior to 
the time of sale and such confusion is more than de minimis. 
Congress should also take heed of the policy reasons why we 
should not punish “initial interest” absent likely confusion.  Even if 
courts do eliminate the errant initial interest confusion doctrine, it is 
likely that powerful trademark holders will try to codify the doctrine 
back into the law.  In recent years, Congress has been heavily lobbied 
by some of the most powerful intellectual property groups and has 
codified more and more expansions of intellectual property laws at the 
expense of the public and smaller businesses.  Such efforts should be 
rebuffed with regard to initial interest confusion since the doctrine flies 
in the face of the justifications for trademark protection and the Lanham 
Act, and raises serious conflicts with the First Amendment and other 
intellectual property laws. 
In the years ahead, important choices will be made about how we 
want the Internet to look and how we shape business conducted online.  
At the same time, we are at a crucial juncture in trademark law in which 
courts and Congress will need to decide what role the consideration of 
consumers plays in determining the scope of trademark rights.  
Trademark law was never meant to be a property grant to individual 
trademark holders; rather, the protection of trademarks requires a 
careful balance of the interests of trademark holders, competitors and 
the public.  The history of trademark protection in this country 
persuasively demonstrates that courts should consider the public welfare 
rather than an individual corporation’s profits when evaluating 
trademark infringement actions.  Replacing the initial interest confusion 
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doctrine is one critical step in the direction of reclaiming the public’s 
rightful place in trademark law. 
